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Abstract 
This study investigates idea-based and institutional reasons for a change in the European 
Commission’s	  approach	  to	  public service broadcasting in the 2009 Broadcast Communication. Conducting document analysis of position papers of several stakeholders with the theoretical concepts from Advocacy Coalition Framework and Discursive Institutionalism, allows us to examine the interplay between beliefs and institutions.  Our findings show that the changes in the advocacy coalitions’ beliefs could provide an explanation of the change towards a liberal belief in the 2009 Broadcast Communication. Furthermore, the institutional setting provided a framework wherein the liberal advocacy coalition’s discourse benefitted.    
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Introduction 
Problem Area  
In all European countries, broadcasting has traditionally been regulated by the state in the name of the public interest (Tambini 2009: 51). Being publicly funded, Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) has always been a subject of debate, and since the elimination of the monopoly of state-owned broadcasters, PSB has changed character on the new scene of the free market. Questions on how state-funded public service broadcasters should act under market conditions, and what role in the market the public service broadcasters should fulfill, have reoccurred regularly. Particularly since the beginning of the 21st century, it appears that the eligibility of PSB is increasingly questioned. In Britain, the debate culminated in 2010 when the British politicians decided to keep the license fee at the same rate, and an extensive analysis of the necessity of the national public broadcaster, BBC, examining the consequences of closing of the public enterprise (Lindberg 2014).  
These	  changes	  have	  also	  taken	  place	  at	  the	  EU	  level;	  during	  the	  00’s,	  commercial	  media	  operators used EU competition law to lead a number of cases against public service broadcasters and governments, accusing them of competition distorting behavior (Donders & Moe 2014: 431). One of these cases led to a Decision where the European Commission (EC) in 2004 fined the Danish broadcasting network TV2 with approx. 84 million euros, because it was held that the financial support TV2 had received from the Danish government was incompatible with EU competition law (EC 2015). This brought the station in serious economic difficulties until the Danish state decided to lend TV2 the amount (Strøyer 2008).  Interestingly, these movements on the EU level have taken place even though the public service broadcasting area is not very regulated by EU law. This is linked to the ambiguous character of PSB. On the one hand, PSB is ‘directly	  related	  to	  the	  democratic,	  social	  and	  cultural 
needs	  of	  each	  society’ (TFEU 2012: Protocol (29)) and falls under the exclusive competence of the member states, only leaving room for complementary measures by the EU (TFEU 2012: Article 6(c)). On the other, PSB is traditionally financed by member state subsidies, which is incompatible with EU competition rules, an area where the EU has exclusive competences (TFEU 2012, article 3.1(b)).  
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The question of which role the PSB does, and should, have in Europe has been the subject of many research projects (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014; Jakubowics 2004; Donders & Moe 2014). In particular studies of the main lines of conflict from an idea-based approach has emerged, as a balance between the ideas of governmental intervention (dirigistes) and market liberalization (liberals), and between PSB as a national or supranational matter. Although there is a general agreement that the attitude towards PSB is changing, they disagree on how to interpret the changes (Donders & Moe 2014: 429). Their positions differ widely to the question of whether the role of PSB is losing its relevance or whether Europe is on the verge of losing a distinct feature in its media market.  
The	  European	  Commission	  has	  attempted	  to	  clarify	  the	  EU’s	  view	  on	  the	  balance	  between	  competition rules and state aid to public service media through communications to the member states. The first was adopted in 2001 and in 2009 a second, arguably more comprehensive, communication was issued on the grounds that “(…)	  changes in the market 
and in the legal environment	  have	  called	  for	  an	  update	  to	  the	  2001	  Communication” (EC 2009: §7). These Broadcast Communications (henceforth: BC) are intended as guidelines for member states, and it is now the 2009 BC, which is used by the Commission to settle complaints on distortion of competition between commercial media and public service broadcasters (Brevini 2013: 115).  The interpretation has thus been in the hands of the Commission, and the future role of PSB in 
Europe	  depends	  inter	  alia	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  interpretation of EU law. As the 2009 BC is the 
guideline	  for	  the	  Commission’s	  interpretation,	  it	  becomes	  interesting	  to	  examine	  the	  processes leading up to its adoption. Thus, it is highly relevant to examine how and which ideas and discursive practices have been instrumental in the change, and thereby have been influential on the current guidelines as they are expressed in the 2009 BC.  This has led to the following problem formulation:  
Problem Formulation  
How can the interplay between ideas and institutions explain the change in the perception of 
PSB’s	  role?	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Research Questions 
In order to provide a comprehensive reply to the problem formulation and ensure a coherent analysis, we have established some research questions for the different parts of the analysis.  
First part: 1) Which ideas are present in the position papers?  2) What can the ideas say about the advocacy coalitions?  
Second part: 3) How is the change established in the 2009 Broadcast Communication?  
4)	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  ideas	  explain this change?  
Third part:  5) How	  can	  the	  change	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  institutional	  setting,	  such	  as	  the	  Commission’s	  role?  
6)	  How	  can	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  ideas	  and	  the	  institutional	  setting	  explain the change in the perception of PSB?   
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Theory 
This project draws on the trend within in the study of the European Union (EU) towards studies of the Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as conceptualized by Schmidt (2010). Furthermore, the study will draw on concepts from the theory of stakeholder analysis as expressed in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).  The DI approach that we have chosen is to a large extent based on Schmidt (2010), which first and foremost argues that DI can be used as an umbrella term for the many studies that “take	  
account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are 
conveyed	  and	  exchanged	  through	  discourse” (Schmidt 2010: 3). Secondly, it is an elaboration on the common features of these studies, establishing DI as a theoretical framework in its own right. As Schmidt (2010: 3) argues, literature on Discursive Institutionalism can be divided into two broadly defined categories, according to the conceptualization of discourses; either discourses are thought of as a set of ideas, or as an interactive process. Much like her own understanding of DI, the ACF is part of the latter (Schmidt 2010: 3).  However, there are some differences. Although the ACF recognizes the mutually constitutive relation between institutions and ideas, its focus is on the latter, which in its own terminology is called belief systems (Weible et al. 2009: 122). ACF is thereby suitable for discovering the 
link	  between	  stakeholders’	  belief	  systems,	  actions	  and	  the	  policy	  outcome.	  DI,	  on	  the	  other	  hand, emphasizes the ‘discursive processes’ and aims to describe the relation between institutionalized discourses and ideas. It can arguably be placed at a higher level of abstraction, and is thus better suited for an argumentative analysis that examines the preexisting institutionalized discourses and their constitutive role in shaping ideas.  
Discursive Institutionalism 
The DI can explain change in policy areas where other theories lack explanatory power because of the lack of external shocks, which is the source of institutional change according to the other New Institutionalist schools of thought (Schmidt 2010). Studies with their theoretical rooting in RCI, HI and SC are useful to explain outcomes in a negotiation situation, path dependency and social comme il faut. But due to an inelastic conceptualization of 
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institutions as given, static and mainly constraining, this type of studies have succeeded in explaining continuity and fail to explain what make changes happen, besides from external factors and shocks (Schmidt 2010:2).  The very core concept is the discourse, which is a somewhat broad term. It is in the discursive practices – in the exchange of ideas - we	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  how	  ideas	  become	  ‘collective	  
action’	  (Schmidt	  2010:	  15),	  as	  it	  is	  very	  hard to identify the ideas, if they are not articulated and put into context. We cannot rule out that other ideas than the articulated are present, but 
in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  ideas’	  potential	  to	  promote	  institutional	  change, it is fair to expect that they at some point are expressed in a political environment, such as the EU. With that premise laid out for our study, in conjunction with other studies under the influence of the DI framework, 
it	  is	  consequential	  that	  the	  ‘sole’	  research	  focus	  is	  discourses,	  understood as expressed and contextualized ideas (Lynggaard 2012: 88). This does not rule out the possibility of external explanations, but these are not incorporated in the analysis as such; they can only be incorporated as points of critical reflection.  The discourse in this project is represented by the most institutionalized articulation of ideas, in our project being the problem definition, causal relation and solution described in the 2009 BC. Some would argue that the ideas represented in other documents that we examine, such as court cases, can be seen as expressions of a discourse as well, but in order to ensure conceptual clarity and avoid confusion and conceptual overlaps between the independent and dependent variable, the former will be characterized as ideas and the latter is the discourse. 
In	  the	  institutionalization	  process,	  the	  discourse	  as	  a	  ‘rule-based	  system	  of	  concepts’	  is	  formalized, written down, formally committed to by different parties and there are sanction-possibilities, if the rules are not followed (Lynggaard 2007b:295). When a discourse is 
institutionalized,	  it	  is	  per	  definition	  a	  discourse	  in	  its	  ‘strongest’	  version,	  since	  it	  is	  linked	  to	  sanctions and authorization (Lynggaard 2007b: 296).  
Causality in Discursive Institutionalism The discursive	  practices	  out	  folds	  at	  different	  ‘levels’	  or	  stages	  in	  a	  process.	  In	  a	  simplistic	  model, the causal relationship between ideas and institutional change can be described like this: 
Shared Beliefs or Sheer Competition?   Spring 2015: EU-studies K1 
A Study of European Public Service Broadcasting  Roskilde University 
Page 9 of 74   
Idea  Discourse  Institutional Change (Lynggaard 2007b: 294p) The logical sequence from idea to institution identifies a two-stage process. The one from idea to discourse through articulation and another from discourse to institutions through 
institutionalization (Lynggaard 2007b: 295).  This underlying	  comprehension	  of	  ideas	  as	  part	  of	  actors’	  underlying	  logic	  and	  therefore	  also	  part of the explanation of institutional change can provide an interesting explanatory power 
in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  European	  Union’s	  PSB	  policy	  (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 21). In the case of the PSB policy area, extensive studies have performed detailed analyses of the legal and factual events leading up to different outcomes, and mapped out the key problems (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 19). Discursive Institutionalism takes on a different, dynamic approach to the concept of institutions, that allows us to recognize the construction and articulation of competing ideas as significant processes that explain change in public choices as they are expressed in institutionalized structures (Schmidt 2010: 20) and trace how the formation of ideas within a certain field is articulated into discourses that eventually have the potential of leading to institutional change (Schmidt 2010: 4).  This movement will be examined in the first two parts of our analysis, wherein the discourse is seen as the dependent variable, and it is affected by the coordinative practices, as argued by Schmidt (2010: 3). The project is delimited from studying the communicative practices, which is the discursive process between actors in the public landscape such as politicians and civil society, as these are usually weaker in compound polities such as the EU (Schmidt 2008: 313). Correspondingly, the coordinative practices are stronger in such a polity, whereby the discursive process between actors within the political system is more important.  The third part of the analysis relies on the understanding of institutions as endogenous of nature and internal to sentient agent, making the change or maintenance of institutions into a dynamic process, wherein actors and institutions are mutually constitutive (Schmidt 2010: 5). According to Schmidt (2008), this is facilitated by their background ideational, and foreground discursive, abilities: “Agents’	  background	  ideational	  abilities	  enable	  them	  to	  act	  in	  
any given meaning context to create and maintain institutions while their foreground discursive 
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abilities enable them to communicate critically about those institutions and so to change or 
maintain them” (Schmidt 2008: 322).  This argument can point to the weakness in the causal explanation that Lynggaard (2007b) provides, as ideas, that are produced and shaped by actors, are also constituted by the institutionalized discourses, whereby the causal logic is circular. Indeed, Radaelli & Schmidt (2004) argues that the causal influence of discourses can be explained in the way that “(…)	  the	  
ideas it conveys become part of the common understanding of the issue, such that policy actors 
cannot act without	  addressing	  its	  concerns,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  agree	  to	  the	  policy” (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004: 203).  Consequently, discursive processes are understood as ”not	  only	  what	  is	  said,	  or	  the	  ideas	  that	  
are the substantive content of discourse, but also who said what	  to	  whom	  where	  and	  why” (Schmidt 2010:15). Our analysis is based on this circular logic; the first and second part aims 
to	  discover	  ‘what	  is	  said’,	  and	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  process	  of	  change	  from	  idea	  to	  institutionalized discourse, and the third part	  examines	  ‘to	  whom	  where	  and	  why’,	  discussing	  
the	  surrounding	  institutions’	  effect	  on	  the	  discourse,	  as	  institutions	  can	  be	  both	  “constraining	  
structures	  and	  enabling	  constructs	  of	  meaning” (Schmidt 2010: 4). The aim is thus to find the common understanding evident in both advocacy coalitions of the issues that are linked to the role of PSB on the market.   
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Advocacy Coalition Framework 
As previously established, Schmidt (2010: 20) argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework is part of the literature that sees discourses at an interactive process, albeit acknowledging its position in Rational Choice Institutionalism.	  This	  strand	  in	  literature	  also	  counts	  Haas’	  (1992)	  
epistemic communities, which is a more loosely defined group of individuals that share a common set of ideas, and the discourse coalitions, which is the articulation and practices that conforms to a set of story lines (Hajer 2006: 45). In that context, the ACF definition of advocacy coalitions adds another criterion. It is not merely individuals that share the same belief systems, but furthermore, they “show	  a	  non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over 
time”	  (Sabatier	  1988:	  139),	  meaning	  that	  they	  frequently	  work	  together	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  the policy outcome. The focus is thereby on ideas’	  effect	  on	  the	  policy	  outcome	  – similar to the causality proposed by Lynggaard (2007b) – but also acknowledges the circular causal logic, as evident by the roots in bounded rationality and attention to the concept of learning, as well as the recognition	  of	  new	  experiences	  and	  information’s	  effect	  on	  beliefs	  (Weible	  et.al	  2009:	  123).  The ACF was developed in the United States, but has undergone several revisions in order to broaden the applicability to other political systems as well, albeit still based on national politics (Weible et.al 2009: 123p). This may have some implications for the applicability in this project, as the EU is identical to neither of these political systems, but there are still common features. The starting point in the US also serves as an explanation to some of the 
ACF’s	  characteristics. The theory was developed as a means to understanding policy change over a longer time span, in a more complex subsystem with additional actors than the identified iron triangle, being the congress, interest groups and the bureaucracy. Furthermore, it was an objection to the common theories of policy processes that was based on the homo 
economicus; there was “a	  need	  for	  a	  more	  realistic	  model	  of	  the	  individual	  rooted	  more	  deeply	  in	  
psychology rather than	  microeconomics.” (Weible et al. 2011: 349). From that point of departure, the theory developed into an extensive theoretical framework, accounting for the most important aspects leading to change in a policy process.  
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Assumptions: Limits and Possibilities  
The ACF is based on a set of assumptions that will be clarified in the following. Although we do not aim to test the underlying assumptions of the theory, a clarification of the premises may be valuable in order to determine some limits and possibilities in relation to our study.  Among the underlying assumptions of this theory, is the one on bounded rationality, meaning that individuals relies on their belief systems to filter, simplify or even distort the information that is presented to them. This assumption affects the view on policy strategies, which should mainly be seen as “translations	  of	  beliefs”	  (Sabatier	  &	  Jenkins-Smith 1999: 119p). Another premise is that scientific and technical information is very important to policy-makers, in order for them to measure the costs and benefits of their proposed legislation.  There are in particular two assumptions affecting our delimitation. Regarding the timeframe of the analysis, the ACF argues that it should be 10 years or more in order to comprehend all the aspects of a policy process and for long-lasting change to occur. As we have chosen to delimit the study from parts of the policy process – such as the process behind the 2001 BC and the implementation of the 2009 BC – the timeframe is correspondingly shorter. It could for example provide insightful knowledge to examine the differences in active advocacy coalitions prior to the 2001 BC, as it could enable us to say something about the causal relations. However, as the substantial law that is referred to in the legal texts is considerable older, such as Treaty Articles, some of the more long-term ideas are included.  The final premise has to do with the selection of important actors in the analysis. According to Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 119), the concept of a policy subsystem should be broadened to mean not only the iron triangle, as mentioned previously, but to mean actors from all levels of governance; journalists, researchers, the public, and international, national and local authorities. Therefore, our study includes a variety of different actors from both inside and outside the iron triangle.  
Belief Systems 
One of the main features of ACF is the so-called belief systems, which are essential to the formation of advocacy coalitions, and causal drivers for political behavior. Belief systems are 
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generally	  seen	  as	  “a	  set	  of	  basic	  values,	  causal	  assumptions	  and	  problem	  perceptions” (Sabatier 1988: 39). However, there are several layers of belief systems, according to the mobility of the beliefs. Deep core beliefs are the most stable among the beliefs, such as the position on individual freedom versus equality (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 120).  
Policy core beliefs are	  the	  next	  type	  of	  beliefs.	  Policy	  core	  beliefs	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  coalition’s	  commitments and normative view on an entire policy domain, and the underlying causal logic (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 121). Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 122) exemplifies this type with the relative importance of economic development versus environmental protection, but also the strategies for upholding these values, such as the level of government intervention necessary or the best policy instruments to use. This belief is usually also resistant to change. However, change can occur because of a scientific	  coalitions’	  coordinated	  action over time – as is witnessed in for example environmental policy (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Translated onto our area of inquiry, these policy core beliefs can be exemplified by the dirigiste versus the liberal approach to EU media policy; those who view government intervention as necessary and those who believe in the normative principles of the free market, respectively. The lowest level of beliefs are the so-called secondary beliefs, which are comprised sets of narrow beliefs. This can include the perceived importance of the problem or of certain causal explanations, but the secondary beliefs are not necessarily homogenous internally in the advocacy coalitions. The focus of our project is on the policy core beliefs, as these are the 
“fundamental glue of coalitions”	  (Sabatier	  &	  Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Secondary beliefs may be different within advocacy coalitions; many studies have shown, that homogeneity within advocacy coalitions should not be assumed (Weible et al. 2009: 130).  
The Four Paths to Policy Change  
According to ACF, four paths to policy change have been identified. The first path is through external events, being defined as “shifts	  in	  the	  policy	  core	  attributes	  of	  the	  subsystem” (Weible et al. 2009: 124). The relationship between external shocks and internal events as the explanatory, independent variables that induce policy change. These considerations are widely studied (Weible et al. 2009: 128). The second path allows for change through policy-
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oriented learning, where actors alter their perceptions and actions based on new experience and/or new information (Weible et al. 2009: 124). This particular link is not very well documented, however, as studies focusing on this link have produced mixed results (Weible et al. 2009: 130). Furthermore, it should be noted that learning between coalitions rarely happens in a “high conflict situation” (Weible et al. 2009: 130). The third path to policy change is through internal events, mainly connected to problems such as crises, scandals and failures in the subsystem (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014: 202). The fourth path is present when two or more coalitions negotiate and come to some agreement in an institutional setting of 
‘professional	  forums’.	  This	  builds on previous ACF studies that have examined the conditions for cross-coalition learning (Weible et al. 2009: 124). These four paths are not understood as being mutually exclusive. They can be present to a smaller or larger degree. It may be useful to be aware of the typology, in order to be able to identify indications that the political process has taken one or several of these paths.  
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Research Method 
The	  term	  “media	  policy”	  is	  a	  broad	  term	  that	  covers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  more	  sector-specific policies; technology and digitization, production of cultural entities such as movies, protection of journalist and ensuring transparency and more. Our main focus is the development in the public service broadcasting (PSB) policies. This particular policy area is an interesting one in many aspects, mainly because it is a quite contentious subject. This subject has received considerable attention in the academic world, more recently in the strand of research that operates within the conceptual framework of ideas and ideational change (e.g. Jakubowics 2004; Humphreys 2007).  In the following sections, our approach to the research field and the methodological considerations are outlined. 
Delimitation 
The	  timeframe	  begins	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  “Communication from the Commission on the 
application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting”	  (EC 2001), more commonly referred to as the 2001 BC. The introduction of competition to the media systems in the member states meant that the media policies were now to be included in the competition policy. This opened up for the possibility of interpreting the provisions on prohibition of state 
aid	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  member	  states’ public service media systems. This development was one of the reasons that the Commission issued the 2001 BC, as a clarification on the scope of the state aid prohibition. The Communication was a measure adopted due to the increasing number of lawsuit challenging the state aid to public service broadcasters in member states. The analysis mainly concerns the changes of the discourse between the 2001 Broadcast Communication and the 2009 Broadcast Communication.  The empirical basis for a document analysis in this research field is extensive. In the selected time period – 2001 to 2009 – alone, there are over 20 decisions made by the Commission (EC 2009: §4), all related to the 2009 Broadcast Communication. In 16 cases (from 1996 to 2011) 
the	  Commission’s	  decision	  to	  investigate	  a	  PSB’s	  relationship	  to	  state	  aid,	  was	  initiated	  by	  complains of market distortion from private stakeholders (Donders & Moe 2014: 431). Leading up to the revision of the Broadcast Communication, the Commission facilitated a Public Consultation in 2008, sending a Questionnaire to all relevant parties in this discussion 
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– everyone from private broadcasting companies to journalist unions – which resulted in Position Papers from 122 stakeholders, including member states, private broadcasting corporations, associations, state funded media with a public service remit and print media associations (EC 2008a). Moreover, that was not the only hearing. The draft for the 2009 BC was altered a second time before adopted, and which indicates that there has been lively debate during the public consultations between these drafts.  The extensive amount of documentation in the process leading to the final 2009 Broadcast Communication requires a careful and systematic collection, organization and selection, in order to attain a reliable ‘sample’	  that the analysis can build upon in this study. This is secured by drawing on several methodological reflections (Lynggaard 2007a; Lynggaard 2007b; Lynggaard 2012), which provide the framework for the document analysis of ideas and ideational change. In doing so, we secure the transparency of the study, aiming to meet the risk of reaching other conclusions had we focused our attention on other documents and stakeholders.  
Documents and Stakeholders  
In the following, we shall explain how we have selected the documents and stakeholders and account for why they are relevant to analyze.  The selection of documents and stakeholders for the analysis is based on a combination of three methodological approaches: Backwards mapping, the hierarchy of documents and categorization of advocacy coalitions.  Considering these methodological reflections, we are able to arrange the empirical material, the 25 Commission Decisions and the 122 Position Papers, in accordance with each other and select the documents for analysis, which will provide a reliable empirical foundation to track the ideological drivers of the discursive change.     
Backwards Mapping Firstly, in order to get an overall picture of the focal points and areas of scientific interest in this contested corner of media policy, this study turns to the method of backwards mapping. This method was traditionally used for identifying agency networks, but can also be used for 
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the selection process preceding the document analysis (Lynggaard 2007a: 225). Often, the method for unraveling the complex map of documents and agents is through interviews. Instead of interviews, however, our point of departure lies in academic work, more specifically the work of Donders et. al (2014), Donders & Moe (2014) as well as Van den Bulck & Donders (2014). These texts lay the foundation for further analysis, as they provide an overview of the development of the Media Policy in the EU as well as a stakeholder- and Advocacy Coalition Network-analysis, respectively.  Through this initial phase of backwards mapping, our attention was drawn to the 2001 and 2009 Broadcast Communications. This brought the process of backwards mapping to a new phase as we used the documents themselves to lead to new clues. For example, the 2009 Communication refers to different circumstances leading to the formulation of the Communication, that is: A rapid development of new market areas due to the technological evolution, extensive legal development since 2001, a rise in concern for a level playing field from the private operators and the evolution of	  the	  Commission’s	  own	  decision-making practice (EC 2009). These paths are then pursued, and more references to actors or documents are presented. By following both academic leads as well as leads pointed out by the actors within the research field, we have heightened	  this	  study’s	  accountability. In that way, we examine both what the parties involved in the process considers the change-driving factors, as well as what the academic society surrounding the process emphasizes. Cross-references in the two environments are good indicators for significant drivers. Thus, for 
example,	  the	  Commission’s	  Decisions	  are	  analyzed, because they are highlighted and analyzed as significant to the changing process by both the Commission itself and the academic environment (Donders & Moe 2014).  Likewise, cross-references	  between	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  decisions	  on State aid – either as subject to investigation or as complainant – and a presence of their views on the matter expressed as position papers, are in this study used as a guidance to direct to which stakeholders are relevant to include in the analysis (see Annex I). An active involvement in the ongoing debate could indicate	  a	  stakeholder’s	  intention	  to	  influence	  the	  process, either to preserve the status quo situation or to push for change.  
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In theory, references should be traced until there is no new aspects, documents, or actors, but in practice, it is up to the researcher to determine when to stop tracing (Lynggaard 2007a: 226).  
The Hierarchy of Documents  In this section, the hierarchy of the documents is accounted for in order to assess the degree of institutionalization.     
In	  conjunction	  with	  the	  “hierarchy	  of	  documents”	  established	  by	  Lynggaard	  (2007b: 298) 
according	  to	  the	  documents’	  degree	  of	  institutionalization,	  the	  documents central to the debate concerning state aid to PSBs are identified. According to Lynggaard, legal documents such as Treaty articles, Regulations and Directives are highly institutionalized, because they have undergone a long process of negotiations and, when adopted, authorized by a large number of agents. Furthermore, infringements of these are sanctioned, either formally or informally. Commission Communications are institutionalized to a medium extent and EP Resolutions, reports, and policy papers hold a low degree of institutionalization (Lynggaard 2007b: 298).  Through this classification, we can establish some inferences on the role of this research 
field’s	  different	  types	  of	  documents	  relative	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  documents. One could deduce that the least institutionalized documents are more likely to contain ideas that are not yet dominant discourses, and ideational change is then expected to be identified in the arguments used in more institutionalized texts.   However, it should be noted that this classification is developed in relation to a study on the development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is a far more institutionalized policy area, which presumably will have an influence on the types of relevant documents. One could also argue that the CAP is less fragmented or multileveled compared to the media policies, as there is less room for maneuver for the Member States in CAP-policies because of the competences handed to the EU.  
Based	  on	  Lynggaard’s	  categorization of the hierarchy of documents, the following model is constructed, adjusted to the more loosely organized policy area of state aid and public service broadcasting:  
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Figure 1: Illustration of the hierarchy of documents, based on Lynggaard (2007b: 298). "Articulation" and 
"Institutionalization”	  as	  process	  arrows	  are	  added, and our own categorization of documents is applied. 
As	  Lynggaard’s	  concepts	  of	  institutionalization	  translates	  to	  the	  policy	  area	  of	  public service broadcasting policies, this study argues that the 2009 BC may be seen as more institutionalized than Communications within the CAP area, since the Commission included so many different views. Therefore, it can be seen as more institutionalized. Furthermore, this Communication is used as a central point of reference, when the Commission issues Decisions on state aid to public service media. Therefore, if public service media shall avoid accusations of illegal state aid, it may be most convenient to stay in line with the 2009 Communication. Thus the Communication can be seen as a document with a high degree of authorization.   The second type of documents relevant to analyze is Position Papers made	  by	  this	  field’s	  different stakeholders. They express ideas and systems of beliefs, which other stakeholders within this policy process not necessarily commit to. They hold no sanctioning power as such and are thus regarded as documents with a low level of institutionalization. Given their place in the articulation phase of the process, they hold no strong transformative power. This lead that we should be careful not to give to much explanation power to a wording in a single position paper, when conducting the analysis. However, these documents are relevant because they express clear positioning in accordance to belief system.  Another type of document that provides a basis for the mapping of interests is The 
Commission’s	  Decisions.	  During the process leading to the 2009 Broadcast Communication, the decisions on the matter have been many and of different types (Annex I). A decision made 
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by the Commission can be seen as semi-institutionalized, since many stakeholders refer to them as authoritarian (Lynggaard 2007: 298), but stakeholders can (and do) question these decisions at the Court of Justice. Decisions in this area are thus not necessarily committed to and authorized by many stakeholders. Still, the ideas expressed in the Decisions are relatively organized.  
Categorization of Advocacy Coalitions In conjunction with the advocacy coalitions identified in Van den Bulck & Donders (2014), relevant documents and actors can be traced. In Table 1, the preliminary actors are listed according to the advocacy coalitions:  
Advocacy 
Coalition 
View on media Economic 
rationale  
Stakeholders 
Public Service 
Believers 
Media should be 
supported	  due	  to	  “social	  
responsibility”-role 
Visible hand of Government  Many	  EU	  MS’	   Public Broadcasters (e.g. the EBU)  Cultural Organizations The educational field  Academics (e.g. media- and state theory) The Council of Europe 
Public Service 
Sceptics 
Media is an enterprise 
like	  others,	  “liberal”	  view Invisible hand of Market Commercial broadcasters (e.g. the Association of Commercial Television) Newspaper publishers  
Table 1: Advocacy Coalitions (based on Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 20pp) This categorization of stakeholders in advocacy coalitions is based on findings in previous academic works, the theoretical framework of advocacy coalitions, as well as the initial research of the relevant documents. According to the theoretical considerations on the policy core beliefs, they tend to be resistant to change, but learning and changing views can happen (see Advocacy Coalition Framework, p. 13). This demands that we keep an open mind, when conducting the analysis. As a method to select relevant documents, this preliminary division of advocacy coalitions is helpful, mainly when selecting position papers in order to ensure a 
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relatively balanced representation of the different belief systems. Furthermore, we mainly examine the position papers of groups of a certain size, choosing umbrella organizations over national associations and common position papers when possible.  
Identifying Policy Core Beliefs 
When incorporating theory into the reflections on research method, it can be argued that the reliability of the explanatory power of the theory can be examined through the reliability of 
the	  study’s	  inferences,	  if	  the	  theory	  and	  methods	  correspond.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  study	  relies	  on	  document analyses, which is based on a qualitative content analysis. When conducting content analyses, it is important to clarify the specific analytical questions, in order to heighten the reliability. The following section clarifies the methods for identifying the policy core beliefs, which is relevant to the first and second part of the analysis.  In accordance with the theoretical logic of the process from policy belief to institutionalized discourse that underpins the analysis, the first step is to determine the initial ideas. As policy 
core	  beliefs	  are	  understood	  as	  the	  actors’	  problem definition, the cause and the solution, they are visible to the observer through analyses of the underlying logics of the arguments used by the agents in the process. However, simply posing analytical questions of how the problem is defined, which causal interpretations are present, and what the solution is, may lead to problems of reliability, because the questions are not specific enough; we may interpret the texts differently. We have aimed to meet this concern by conducting a cursory reading of the documents independently of each other.  According to Lynggaard (2007a: 226), the problem definition and the cause can be identified through an analysis of causal interpretations, which is typically best analyzed with a systematic distinction of certain attributes. One of the examples provided by Lynggaard (2007a: 227) is the distinction between the perception that the problems are caused by individuals, against the perception that the cause is a result of structural circumstances. Another distinction could be whether the problem is short-term or long-term.  In our study, the research questions revolve around two conflict lines that are mutually exclusive. These lines could be illustrated	  by	  two	  axis’	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  The	  problem-axis, which 
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is horizontal, ranges the problem from being The Liberalization of Market to being Government 
Intervention. The solution-axis, which is the vertical, ranges the solution from being found at the National to being found at the Supranational level (see Figure 2).  
The liberal belief can broadly be characterized by a push for a liberalization of the media market and a fight against the state aid for PSB. This view considers state aid for public service media to be a violation of the rules on prohibition of state aid, and a market-distorting measure that disrupts the integration of the internal market. The dirigiste belief can broadly be characterized by its call for a government intervention in the media market, in order to ensure a genuinely diverse media landscape and high-quality journalistic products (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 25).  Although we can expect that many liberal actors will condone supra-nationalism based on the long tradition and law establishing the EU as the primary driver for market liberalization in the EU, it is no certainty. It is still possible to believe that public service is unnecessary and perhaps even reduces quality or diversity, whilst believing that the competences to decide and regulate should lie with the member state. In the same way, it is possible to believe in either the National or the Supranational solutions, whilst condoning public service broadcasting.  Based on these conflict lines, a map of beliefs can be drawn up (Figure 2). Establishing the conflict lines as crossing spectrums enables us to have more room for maneuver and nuance, 
in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  may	  fit	  more	  precisely	  with	  the	  different	  actors’	  beliefs.	   Based on these characteristics, the analytical questions are as follows:  
- How is the problem defined, and what is the cause: 
o Is the problem, entirely or mostly, related to a government intervention in the media markets through some type of subsidy? 
Figure 2: The Policy Core Belief Map 
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OR: Is the problem, entirely or mostly, related to a liberalized market?  
- What is the solution:  
o Should the problem be dealt with on, entirely or mostly, the EU-level?  OR: Should the problem be dealt with on, entirely or mostly, a governance level that is lower than EU-level, e.g. national/regional/local?   It should be noted that sometimes, the problems or causes are not explicitly stated in the documents. If that is the case, the suggested solution often reveals the assumptions that it is based on and thereby the underlying logic of the argument. By identifying the solutions to the identified problems, it is furthermore possible to assess which solutions are regarded as accessible, acceptable, and feasible (Lynggaard 2007a: 228).  Through a systematic approach to the documents over time, it is possible to identify which problems and solutions are considered legitimate at different points in time and by different actors or coalitions, and thereby it is possible to identify the ideational change. As we are examining discourses in the political sphere and their influence on policies, the ideational change is identified through identifications of ideas over time, until the most recent, relatively authoritative document is reached.  As previously described, our assumption is that the liberal advocacy coalition will most likely point to the supranational solutions at EU-level, and the dirigiste advocacy coalition will point to the national solutions (see Figure 2).   
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Analysis Strategy  
This chapter outlines the analysis strategy, in order to provide an overview of the relationship between the different parts of the analysis.  The analysis is divided into three parts:  
First part: 
1) Which ideas are present in the position papers?  
2) What can the ideas say about the advocacy coalitions?  Part one of the analysis examines	  the	  two	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  articulation	  of	  ideas,	  as	  
expressed	  by	  the	  perceived	  problem	  definition,	  cause,	  and	  solution	  in	  the	  stakeholders’	  position papers for the public consultation process, which was instigated by the Commission.  This is examined by using the conceptual tools provided by the theory of advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which is operationalized by the empirically based map of policy core beliefs. By identifying the policy core beliefs and the coordination abilities, we can characterize the coalitions.  
Second part: 
3) How is the change established in the 2009 Broadcast Communication?  
4)	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  ideas	  explain	  this	  change?	   Part two of the analysis first identifies the changes between the 2001 and 2009 BC and the 
presence	  of	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  policy	  core	  beliefs.	  Afterwards,	  it	  is	  examined	  how	  the	  change has taken place, through an assessment of the path towards change, which is related to 
the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  mutual	  relationship.	   The theoretical	  conceptualization	  of	  ‘paths	  to	  change’	  from	  ACF	  is,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  findings from the first part of the analysis on the characteristics of the advocacy coalitions, used to explain the change.  
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Third part:  
5) How can the change be explained by the institutional setting, such as the 
Commission’s	  role?	   
6)	  How	  can	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  ideas	  and	  the	  institutional	  
setting explain the change in the perception of PSB?  This part aims to complement the findings from the other parts, by analyzing first how the institutional setting, in which this process has taken place, can explain the outcome, but also 
how	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  advocacy	  coalition’s	  ideas	  and	  this	  institutional	  setting	  can	  provide an explanation. The third part of the analysis is based on a different theoretical approach, being that of Discursive Institutionalism.    
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Analysis  
First Part: Mapping the Advocacy Coalitions 
This part of the analysis aims to examine the two advocacy coalitions’	  position papers in the public consultation prior to the 2009 BC. The analysis is divided according to the advocacy coalitions, in a section on the dirigiste coalition and a section on the liberal coalition.  
The Dirigiste Coalition 
The European Broadcasting Union In the following section, the reply from the European Broadcasting Union is analyzed based on the research questions posed (see Analysis Strategy).  The European Broadcasting Union, the EBU, is a European association for public service broadcasters, consisting of 73 active members spread over 56 countries (EBU 2015). Their agenda is not only to protect the public service broadcasters on a European level, but also on an international level. The EBU has been an active respondent to the consultation process prior to the 2009 BC. They have replied to the questionnaire just as many other actors (EC 2012), but furthermore, they have replied directly to the draft communication during the 
“second	  public	  consultation”	  (EBU	  2009)	  (henceforth:	  “public	  consultation	  paper”).	  The	  reply	  to the second public consultation is included in order to identify a possible change in their beliefs.  
General Concerns As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that according to the EBU, there is no problem with status quo regarding the 2001 BC. Generally, they are satisfied with the guidelines in the 2001 BC, as it “(…)	  lays	  down	  flexible	  principles	  which	  have	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  resolve	  a	  number	  
of	  cases” (EBU 2008: 2). The	  ’number	  of	  cases’	  they	  refer	  to	  is the 20 or more decisions the Commission have made up until the public consultation in 2008. In two of the decisions, the Commission held that the funding	  of	  the	  Public	  Service	  Broadcasters	  (henceforth:	  PSB’s)	  was	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incompatible with EU competition rules. This can be an explanation of why the EBU thinks that the rules have made it possible to resolve the cases: the decisions fall out in their favor.     They have certain views on the minimum requirements of a possible new Communication, however. The problem is thus not related to the recent development or the state of things, and there is no problem with the 2001 BC. However, there are certain problems with the suggested revisions of the BC that can be identified to reflect their policy core beliefs. Among the often-mentioned principles is that it should acknowledge the recognition of member state competence in this policy area. Furthermore, they point to the acknowledgement of the specificity of public service broadcasting, as opposed to normal services of general economic interest. Lastly, the implications of the technological development should be taken into account.  Not surprisingly, the EBU can generally be placed in the left side of problem-axis (see Figure 2, p. 22), towards the dirigiste belief. It believes that public service is a necessary means of ensuring diversity, objectivity and quality in the media landscape. In the very beginning of the public consultation paper, they adhere to these principles, whilst arguing that EU law recognizes these principles as well, in the Amsterdam Protocol (EBU 2009: 4). One specific formulation of the Amsterdam Protocol in particular is recurring throughout the document. 
The	  argument	  draws	  on	  the	  notions	  of	  the	  Amsterdam	  Treaty,	  which	  states	  that:	  “(…)	  the	  
system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social 
and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism”	  (Amsterdam	  Treaty 1997: Protocol C, 109), as an introductory consideration for the interpretative provisions agreed upon. Many of the arguments that the EBU presents are based on this very formulation, as will be evident in the following analysis. By referring to the Amsterdam Protocol, they legitimize their belief by establishing it as an already institutionalized discourse, having been accepted and legitimate for over 10 years.  Based this link to the democratic, social, and cultural need of society, they argue that PSB policy is also linked to culture and education. Thereby, the EU has no competence and the actions of the EU can only support member state initiatives, not replace them. This makes the principle of subsidiarity even more important when discussing the possibilities of a common definition of the public service broadcasting remit, as such a definition should be flexible 
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enough to embrace the existing national practices (EBU 2008: 11). This brings us to their position in the spectrum of beliefs on the solution-axis; the belief in a national versus supranational approach. They are very clear about their position in that regard as well; the member states should be the main legislative actors in this policy area. This is backed up by the provision in the Amsterdam Protocol stating that the provisions of the Treaty are 
established	  “	  (…)	  without prejudice to the competence of Member States to provide for the 
funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to broadcasting 
organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by 
each Member State (…)”	  (Amsterdam Treaty 1997: Protocol C, 109). This was confirmed by the Council of the European Union in its Resolution of 25 January 1999 (Council of the European Union 1999).  However, in that regard, it is worth remembering that the Amsterdam Protocol does not only contain these excerpts. The mentioning of the competition law – in particular the note that states that the member states have full competences only “(…)	  insofar	  as	  such	  funding	  does	  not	  
affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent which would be 
contrary	  to	  the	  common	  interest” – is not mentioned by the EBU. The fact that this last part of the provision is not present in the position paper at all, in contrast to the rest of the provision, tells us that the exclusion was deliberately chosen to strengthen their position. 
The Specificity of PSB 
Because	  of	  this	  previously	  mentioned	  provision	  in	  the	  Amsterdam	  Protocol,	  the	  PSB’s	  should	  not be subject to the same laws, or at least not subject to the same interpretations, as other 
SGEI’s.	  According	  to	  the	  EBU,	  “The Amsterdam Protocol stressed the particular nature of public 
service broadcasting, as well as its important role in ensuring democracy, pluralism, social 
cohesion and cultural and linguistic diversity (…)”	  (EBU	  2008:	  8). Thereby	  PSB’s	  have	  a	  special	  
role	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  democracy	  compared	  to	  other	  SGEI’s.	   In their view, EU substantive law does not take a neutral view on the relationship between 
private	  and	  public	  sector	  in	  its	  distinctions	  between	  SGEI’s	  and	  PSB’s.	  The actions and 
operations	  of	  PSB’s	  are	  responsibilities	  to	  their	  societies	  in	  general,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a threat to commercial operators (EBU 2009: 6). The public service broadcasters and the 
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other	  types	  of	  SGEI’s	  are	  not	  equals,	  and	  should	  not	  be treated as such. One of the ways that 
PSB	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  different	  than	  SGEI’s	  is	  due	  to	  the	  “(…)	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  activity,	  as	  
well as the manner in which broadcasting organizations are financed and structured, requires 
different	  treatment” (EBU 2008: 8). Both the differences in finances and structures are further elaborated on in the position paper.  Regarding the finances, they argue that undertakings with a public service remit have a particularly important obligation of ensuring continuity in their activities, which implies that they must guarantee sufficient resources. This can only be accomplished by building up reserves, which is in fact a legal obligation in many member states (EBU 2008: 25). To the closely related question of whether pay-services	  offered	  by	  PSB’s	  should	  always	  be	  considered commercial activities, they argue that the relevant issue is whether the service in question fulfils the needs of each society, not the means of funding (EBU 2008: 19). This claim is backed up by a reference to a judgment by the General Court in 2008, where the General Court confirmed that the operator of a SGEI shall have some discretion regarding price and 
content	  (EBU	  2008:	  19).	  In	  this	  judgment,	  the	  General	  Court	  establishes	  that	  “In effect, the 
compulsory nature of the SGEI mission does not preclude a certain latitude being left to the 
operator on the market, including in relation to the content and pricing of the services which it 
proposes	  to	  provide” (BUPA et al. v Commission, Case T-289/03, point 189). Through the utilization of a General Court judgment, the EBU draws on a belief that has already been articulated by a more institutionalized and accepted EU body, whereby their argument becomes more legitimate.  
Concerning	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  PSB’s,	  the main argument is related to the legal traditions surrounding the definition of the public service remit in different member states, and their different media systems that are also grounded in traditions and institutionalized practices. One of their arguments in that regard is the different levels of specification and legal texts that comprises and defines the public service remits. All member states define the public service remit in a formal law, but most states also adopt complementary guidelines or management contracts that are more detailed, and some even set out criteria for the implementation of these contracts. As a result, there is no need to attribute supplementary objectives when the objectives are clearly defined by a national authority, which is	  the	  member	  states’	  responsibility (EBU 2008: 16).  
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This	  belief	  in	  the	  member	  states’	  abilities	  to	  establish	  a	  well-defined public service remit, can also explain the logic behind the viewpoint that the high number of Decisions by the Commission or the General Court shows that the 2001 BC was a successful legislative tool. The argument that the media systems of member states are very different, also means that the BC should allow for flexible principles that allows for the case-by-case approach in the evaluation of state aid measures (EBU 2008: 2).  
The ex-ante test Other than the more general concerns, the EBU has a number of reservations regarding the suggested ex-ante test. The ex-ante test is a measure that should ensure that the new, publicly funded services still meet the material conditions of the Amsterdam Protocol. The test follows the guidelines that the Commission laid down in three previous cases, but national authorities are responsible for the execution (Repa et al. 2009: 14). As a preliminary remark, they question the legal basis for an ex-ante test, referring to the passage in the Amsterdam Protocol that provides the member states with the discretion to determine the scope and nature of the public service. Furthermore, they refer to the notion in the case BUPA et al. v Commission, wherein the General Court it was determined that the 
Commission	  does	  not	  have	  the	  competences	  to	  change	  member	  states’	  definitions	  of	  Services 
of	  General	  Economic	  Interest	  (henceforth:	  SGEI’s), except in cases of manifest error (BUPA et al. v Commission 2008, Case T-289/0: 166). Afterwards, they point out six other concerns regarding the ex-ante test.  The first problem is that such a test would have to be comprised by both assessment of the effect on competition and public	  value	  assessments.	  As	  the	  “public	  values	  assessment”-part consists of aspects that are mainly under member state competences, such as cultural value or social impact it would not be possible to establish criteria that could apply to all member states (EBU 2008: 12). This aspect is related to the idea that the solution should be found at the national level.  Secondly, the test may open up for influence by politicians or commercial interests, affecting the editorial independence. This would have to be prohibited and avoided through the precautionary measure of requiring that an independent body should carry out the evaluation 
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(EBU 2008: 13). This concern is more related to the protection of a fundamental right, being the freedom of expression (CFR 2010: Art. 11), and could be seen as a secondary belief, as it is 
more	  related	  to	  the	  EBU’s	  specific	  interests	  on behalf of their members.  The third concern regards the technologic and platform neutrality, which would have to be ensured through the previously described	  “dynamic”	  definition	  of	  the	  remit	  (EBU 2008: 13). This dynamic definition should both ensure their share of the online-based market and a smooth process that does not delay the process of introducing new services. The fourth concern is very related to the previous, as the test might cause delays, which is particularly problematic in this sector because of the innovation speed and the high level of competition (EBU 2008: 13). The fifth concern regards the financing of such tests, as they are normally high-cost measures. According to the EBU, “imposing	  such	  costs	  for	  certain	  new	  services	  to	  be	  
offered could be disproportionate compared to the limited effect that these services could have 
on the market.” (EBU 2008: 13). These three concerns can reflect	  the	  EBU’s	  practical	  concerns	  on behalf of their members, in contrast to some of the other arguments that are more tied to the subsidiarity principle, and thus also be characterized as more secondary beliefs.  Finally, there is the general belief that the	  Commission’s	  decision-making practice, which, at the time only constituted one publicly available decision regarding Germany, cannot be summed up, generalized and applied to all member states. Again, the principle of subsidiarity is at the heart of this argument.  
External events Other than the issues of the division of competences and specificity of public service broadcasting, the EBU also draws upon some of the recent developments to make their case.  One of the main issues that the Communication is meant to deal with is the impact of the technological development on the media sector, and effect on the public service remit on the new, digital platforms. In that regard, the question has been whether there should be 
“technological	  neutrality”,	  meaning	  that the definition of the public service remit from the traditional media should simply be conferred to the new. To this end, the answer by the EBU has been affirmative; the EBU is very clear in that the changed consumer patterns has led to a need for a changed	  type	  of	  broadcasting	  that	  can	  include	  these	  new	  users’	  habits,	  in	  order	  to	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keep their audience (EBU 2008: 7). This opinion is supported by a reference to the Resolution on PSB from 1999, where Government Representatives and the European Council stated that 
“the fulfilment of the public service broadcasting mission must continue to benefit from 
technological progress" (Council of the European Union 1999: Point 3). They see the technological development as an opportunity to spread the PSB as a good to a wider audience. Simultaneously, the operators must be present through the traditional channels as well in order to keep the older segment of the audience that has not adapted to the developments. If they cannot reach the wide audience, the EBU predicts that “public	  service	  broadcasters	  will	  
lose the necessary connection with their audience and will no longer be able to play their role as 
a	  trustworthy	  source	  for	  the	  public”	  (EBU 2008: 8). Therefore, it is absolutely critical that they follow the move from traditional	  broadcasting’s	  “push-services”,	  where	  the	  medium	  is	  the	  
radio	  or	  TV,	  to	  the	  new	  era	  of	  “pull-services”,	  where	  the	  users	  are	  more	  selective,	  and	  find	  – or even generate – the content themselves. Otherwise, they cannot fulfil their public service remit of making a diverse offer available to citizens (EBU 2008: 21).  In the very beginning of the position paper, the EBU establishes that the sector evolves rapidly, “which	  makes	  it	  necessary	  also	  to	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  the	  public	  service	  remit	  to	  have 
an	  evolving	  nature”	  (EBU	  2008:	  2).	  Although	  the	  term	  “evolving	  nature”	  is	  not	  very	  clear,	  it	  is	  later argued that the quickly changing sector necessitates that the member states must have the competences to define and, if necessary due to a sudden change, rapidly redefine, the public service remit in order to be able to meet the needs or expectations of the audience (EBU 2008: 7).  In general, the notion of competition is less important than the well-working production and distribution of PSB, as expressed by e.g. the belief that the extent of public service should not be dependent on the offer from private operators (EBU 2008: 19p). Furthermore, they argue in the public consultation paper, that the public service is particularly important during economic downturns, when commercial operators may cut down on news expenditures and production of European programs. According to them, commercial operators will not make 
choices	  that	  benefit	  society	  when	  faced	  with	  financial	  difficulties:	  “Only adequately and 
securely funded public service broadcasters would be prepared to continue to invest in 
technological innovation, driven not by profit incentives but by a commitment to break new 
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ground	  for	  the	  constant	  improvement	  of	  their	  services	  to	  citizens.” (EBU 2009: 5). This argument is particularly interesting, as it can be seen as devil shifting, which shows that the EBU may consider the commercial operators to be more evil or powerful than they may, in fact, be.  
Summary As it turns out, the EBU is both believer of a dirigiste approach, but it is also an advocate for respecting the principle of subsidiarity. As previously mentioned, there is no perceived problem with the status quo, which means that the suggested solution is to terminate the process of making a new Communication. Thereby, as Lynggaard (2007a: 228) suggests, the solution is more easily identified than the problem and cause.  The perceived problem that can be identified in the position paper is thus related to the proposed content of the 2009 BC. A range of problems is identified, and it seems that the 
answers	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  questions	  consists	  only	  of	  arguments	  against	  the	  renewal,	  no	  matter the specific measure in question. The relationship between the number of members in the organization and the level of detail in the document could suggest that the advocacy 
coalition	  is	  quite	  strong.	  If	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  members’	  belief	  systems	  did	  not	  correspond,	  the EBU would not be able to incorporate so many details. The strength of the coalition can also be identified by the unwillingness to compromise, which shows in the one-sided argumentation and the lack of openness towards alternative solutions.  Despite the broad range of specific problems, the underlying problem definition is related to the idea of a common definition of the public service broadcasting remit. It is not merely that there is no legal grounds for one as such, but also that it would damage the quality of public service in the member states. The cause of this damage is that the cultural, social and democratic needs of the societies of the EU are very different, whereby a common definition would hurt the public service offers one or more of the member states.  
Furthermore,	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  understanding	  of	  the	  PSB’s	  as	  entities	  that	  are not subject to the market mechanisms, and therefore do not act based on the mindset of the utility-
maximizing	  individual.	  The	  PSB’s	  actions	  are	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  people	  and society, in contrast to the commercial broadcasters.  
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The Member	  States’	  Common	  Position	   During the first round of consultation, where the member states have an opportunity to express their views, 17 member states send in replies to the Commission1. Based on a proposal from Ronald H. A. Plasterk, the Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science, 19 member states2 agrees on a Common Position Paper (Rijksoverheid 2015), wherein they express a very similar view on the proposed BC as	  the	  EBU’s.	  It	  is	  the	  joint	  position paper of the 19 member states that shall be analyzed here, because according to the model of hierarchy of documents, a joint position from 19 national ministers possess a higher degree of institutionalization, since it is authorized by multiple stakeholders (see Figure 1, p. 19). For one, they too believe	  that	  there	  is	  “only	  limited”	  need	  for	  a	  change	  of	  the	  2001	  BC (Rijksoverheid 2015: 1).  They also agree that the Commission must acknowledge the subsidiarity principle and that the BC therefore may only include limited and flexible principles on the definition of the public service remit. Furthermore, they stress the importance of technological neutrality and the competences of the member states to decide procedural matters as well. However, there are some differences of opinion; this group of member states open up for the Commission to adopt a test that shows how the public service media lives up to the requirement as defined by the Amsterdam Treaty; that	  the	  PSB’s	  must	  answer to the social, democratic and cultural needs of society. However, the scope of action for the Commission should still be minimal, as 
“any	  inclusion	  or	  suggestion	  on	  the	  use	  of	  criteria	  concerning	  the	  public	  service	  character	  of	  
activities	  goes	  beyond	  the	  Community’s	  competence.” (Rijksoverheid 2015: 2). Thereby, the main responsibility of defining criteria should still lie with the member states.  It is imaginable that the reason for this difference of opinion between EBU and the common position paper from the 19 member states	  is	  due	  to	  their	  different	  “lenses”	  that	  their	  positions entail; when you look at the arguments that the EBU brings, they mention the economic 
burden	  of	  making	  such	  “high-cost”	  assessment	  measures	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  imposing	  unnecessary time delays. This is not part of the	  member	  states’	  argumentation.	  The EBU                                                         1 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom 2 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonian Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Republic of Hungary, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenian Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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expresses concerns and views on behalf of the public service operators, which gives them concerns on a more practical, business management lens, whereas the member states are more concerned with their own scope of action. In a letter to the British Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Andy Burnham, the Dutch Minister Ronald H. R. Plasterk urges him 
to	  join	  the	  coalition,	  writing	  that	  “First and foremost the position paper underlines the principle 
of subsidiarity,” (Plasterk 2008) and	  that	  the	  “National broadcasting systems are deeply rooted 
in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  fabric	  of	  our	  respective	  communities” (Plasterk 2008). This can be seen as an indicator of the lens that this group of member state politicians see through, where the primary concern is linked to the institutionalized discourses of the different member states regarding their national broadcasting systems. Thereby, it is an example of how coalitions consist of stakeholders that advocate the same solution for different reasons (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 21).   
Cooperation and learning  To the question of whether the coalition of member states can actually be seen as an advocacy coalition, we must return to the definition, which demands that there is some coordinated activity over time. Although the amount of time necessary is rather vague, the theory distinguishes between nascent and mature policy subsystems based on the long-term policy change focus, which leads us to the conclusion that the group of member states cannot be characterized as an advocacy coalition. Rather than categorizing them as an advocacy coalition of its own, it may be useful to see them as components of the same advocacy coalition as the EBU, although the secondary beliefs – in this case identified as allowing the Commission to introduce the ex-ante test – are different. At the same time, it should be noted that their position is significantly less dirigiste than the EBU, and that the primary concern for the member states is protecting the principle of subsidiarity in this policy area, thereby keeping their competences. 
In	  the	  EBU’s	  public	  consultation	  paper	  from	  January	  2009,	  they	  declare	  that	  they	  agree	  with	  
and	  support	  the	  member	  states’	  position	  in	  the	  common	  position	  paper	  (EBU	  2009:	  7).	  This	  can be seen as an example of change in secondary beliefs within an advocacy coalition whose policy core beliefs remain the same. Somewhere between the position paper of March 2008 and the public consultation paper of January 2009, their attitude towards the ex-ante test 
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changed, and suddenly allowed for the Commission to set up some flexible principles if they 
didn’t	  entail	  the	  risk	  of	  reducing	  the	  scope	  of	  action	  for	  member	  states	  or	  public	  service	  operators (EBU 2009: 7). Thus, this alignment of secondary beliefs between the EBU and the member states can be understood as a policy-oriented learning process where stakeholders within the same coalition seek consensus (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 29). Besides the attitude towards the ex-ante test, the views are not very specific or technical, meaning that there may be differences under the surface we cannot identify.  
The Dirigiste Coalition: Interim Conclusion  
Through this analysis of the position papers of the EBU and the joint letter of the member states we identify perceptions of problems and their causes that are predominantly linked to the liberalization of the market. Both stakeholders would prefer a very limited update of the communication (status quo) and the EBU is concerned that a definition and the introduction of ex-ante tests on EU level will harm the quality of PSB at a national level. This places them in the left part of the problem-definition axis. Solution-wise both stakeholders favour the member state competences with emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, which confirm our theoretical assumption that the EBU and the member states share dirigiste policy core beliefs.  There are differences in the two ways of argumentation, though. The member state letter does not express an overwhelming argumentation for the necessity to pay subsidies to their 
national	  PSBs	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  citizens’	  democratic	  rights.	  This	  makes	  the	  member	  
states’	  problem	  perception	  a	  little	  more	  neutral	  in	  the	  question	  regarding	  market	  liberalization versus public financing and thus their position is closer towards the middle on the axis. Furthermore, we	  observe	  a	  softening	  in	  the	  EBU’	  perception	  of	  the	  introduction of ex-ante tests. After the letter from the member states they accept such a regulatory measurement, which could indicate a movement on the problem-definition axis from perceiving the problem as entirely related to the market liberalization to only partly. In turn, the EBU stresses, that the solution must be kept on the national level.  This movement shows an alignment between the EBU and member states in the overall policy core belief system. The advocacy coalition is weak, but the members have to a certain degree 
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managed to align their arguments. In this case this it is at the cost of the EBU’s problem perception and in favour of a reinforcement of the member states as the correct solution.       
The Liberal Coalition 
Association of Commercial Television in Europe: Association of Commercial Television in Europe (ACT) is the interest organization of the biggest European commercial television producers and distributers in 37 European countries.  
Problems and causes The position paper of the ACT emphasizes the existing competition distortion on the broadcasting market as the core problem (ACT 2008: 7), around which the argumentation throughout the paper revolves. According	  to	  them,	  the	  PSB’s	  have achieved	  ‘extraordinary	  
dominance’	  in	  certain	  markets	  (ACT	  2008:	  2).	   This distortion is among other things, caused by the	  ‘circular	  remit’	  of	  public	  service	  (ACT	  2008: 10). The ACT argues that the remit is way too vaguely formulated, which causes confusion	  amongst	  consumers,	  PSB’s, competitors and politicians alike on what public service actually includes. The most striking example, the ACT refers, is in Ireland “where	  the	  Minister 
responsible	  for	  the	  media	  recently	  commented	  that	  public	  service	  broadcasting	  is	  ‘whatever	  RTE	  
does’” [RTE is the biggest PSB in Ireland, ed.](ACT 2008: 10). According to the ACT, this very wide definition of the remit of public service is in direct conflict with the formulation in the 2001 BC,	  where	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  remit	  that	  is	  ‘as	  precise	  as	  possible’	  is	  requested (ACT 2008: 10) and has lead to a situation where “the public service remit in television is 
meaningless	  in	  many	  European	  countries” (ACT 2008: 15).  According to the ACT this loose definition of the remit has caused the PSBs to exploit their 
prerogatives	  of	  the	  remit	  (ACT	  2008:	  9)	  by	  downgrading	  programs	  with	  ‘more	  challenging	  
material’	  and	  use	  the	  public	  funding	  to	  prioritize	  commercial	  content, such as soap operas. Thus, they argue, it is “(…)	  hard to justify in terms of added public or social value or to reconcile 
with the familiar rhetoric of European pubcasters, advocating that the media has a wider role 
than that	  of	  a	  “mere”	  economic	  service” (ACT 2008: 9). In the last part of this quote it is also seen how the ACT, by	  using	  the	  words	  ‘hard	  to	  justify’,	  ‘familiar	  rhetoric’	  and	  ‘advocating’,	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implies that this purpose for the media is not so much a dirigiste policy core belief, as it is a superficial, convenient rhetorical instrument in the ongoing discursive battle on the role of PSB in Europe. This statement/characterization of the PSB’s as acting against their own questionable principles is repeated when the ACT asks the PSBs “merely	  to live up to their PR 
statements	  about	  “distinctiveness	  and	  quality”	  on	  screen,	  not	  just	  when	  talking	  to	  politicians” (ACT 2008: 15).  This depicting of the PSBs can in light of the ACF be viewed as a clear example of ‘devil	  shift’ in their argumentation. Taking this approach to the claims of the PSB’s can also be a reflection of the ACTs own liberalist policy core belief. This can be seen in the assumption that all stakeholders in this policy process are acting in accordance with a utility maximizing logic and thus use whatever means available to promote their economic interest.  Other issues that are linked to actual events are also raised as argumentation for an update of 
the	  BC.	  The	  external	  factors	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  coming	  changes	  in	  the	  ‘digital	  age’,	  which poses a challenge to all stakeholders, including the PSBs (ACT 2008: 1), but seen in the light of the existing market distortion “there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  structural	  problems	  in	  the	  broadcasting	  
regulation	  may	  persist	  into	  the	  online	  world”	  (ACT 2008: 1). 
Development in case law  The ACT also draws attention to the developments in the case law, which have made the 2001 BC inadequate to the actual judicial practice. In particular in the light of the Altmark case of 2005 “because	  it	  provides	  a	  more	  in-depth analysis of the extent of the exception under Art.86 
(2)	  of	  the	  Treaty”	  (ACT 2008: 1). The Altmark Judgment is a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2003, which set up four criteria for services of general economic public interest – public service – that must be met in order not to be examined under the rules of state aid (EC 2013). The Altmark Judgment is thus used to enforce and legitimize the claims of the ACT that the criteria for falling under the exceptions from the state aid provisions in the PSB area are way too vaguely formulated and should be formulated more specifically in the new BC so they live up to the Altmark criteria. Contemplating that the Altmark ruling is made by the ECJ and within the field of competition law, these criteria have a high degree of institutionalization and thus poses a strong argument to support the claims of the ACT.  
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Furthermore, the ACT argues, “complaints	  from	  commercial	  operators	  systematically	  continue	  
to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  system	  doesn’t	  work	  fairly” (ACT 2008: 43). This is deduced from the fact that the Commission in most cases has ruled PSB to be in compliance with the rules on state aid (see Annex I). Here it shows, that in only 2 out of 25 Decisions, the Commission has ruled the PSB activity incompatible with competition law. The conclusion from the ACT is thus that the framework is unable to detect and prevent market distortion despite the clear proof of its existence evident in form of the continuation of complaints filed to the EC on illegal state aid.  
Solution The ACT lists seven criteria that the new edition of the BC should include in order to restore the balance of the market. Amongst others are a definition of the remit, external control by an independent body, ex-ante determination of what qualifies a PSB to receive financial compensation (ACT 2008: 9).  Two of the criteria, the definition of the remit and the introduction of ex-ante determination, should according to the ACT be secured in legal acts (ACT 2008: 9). This could indicate which of the criteria the ACT considers most important to transport into the new BC, because with the high degree of institutionalization legal acts are authorized and can be followed up by sanctions.  The ACT position on the need for a more clear and precise definition of the remit is underpinned with the degree of detail the position paper proceeds to when exemplifying what such a precise definition should entail in practice: “Entertainment,	  fiction	  and	  sports	  are	  clearly	  
genres where the remit must be fine tuned to avoid market distortions: entertainment must be a 
reference in terms of quality, and minimum knowledge skills must be defined for participation in 
quiz-shows;”	  (ACT 2008: 15) (!). This proposal on a more detailed public service remit definition is backed by the second part of the Amsterdam Protocol, which states that member 
states	  are	  allowed	  to	  fund	  PSB’s	  that	  live	  up	  to	  their	  public	  service	  remit	  “insofar as such 
funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent which 
would be contrary to the common interest” (Amsterdam Treaty 1997: Protocol C, 109). ACT only chooses to quote this part in the Position Paper, while the rest is summarized. Looking closer at the entirety of the Treaty Article, it does quite explicitly state that it is up to the 
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member states to ‘confer, define and organize’ what constitutes a fulfillment of the public service remit.  With regards to the ex-ante	  proposal,	  the	  ACT	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  ‘much	  needed’	  (ACT	  2008:	  7)	  and dedicates three pages to answer the question on this idea with an evaluation of the so-called public value test, Britain has introduced. The ACT assesses which parts of the test that can be used on a European level and what improvements would be needed in order to fully live up to its aim as an assessment of what public service is worth in money (ACT 2008: 16-18).    With all these problems and solutions carefully spelled out in the 50 pages long reply to the EC questionnaire, there is room for some nuances. The ACT recognizes that the market of broadcasting functions as a dual system, where private and public broadcasters coexist (ACT 2008: 7): ”(…) public broadcasters should benefit from public funding, and commercial 
operators should be left to compete for market resources. This is the optimum system – not least 
from the perspective of encouraging distinctive programming” (ACT 2008: 30).  In this paragraph the idea of distinctive programming as a desirable market situation is not referred to something the ACT wishes to dissociate from. Expressed here it could be interpreted as a policy core belief the ACT commits to and argues on the basis of.   As a concluding remark on the position paper, this acceptance of the PSB services in the market is used as a chance to offer the PSB’s	  a little lecture on the facts of life in the commercial world: ”Compliance costs and regulatory and administrative burdens are a fact of 
life in any business, not least in commercial broadcasting, and we would argue are a reasonable 
price to pay also for our publicly-funded competitors in exchange for the enormous privilege and 
competitive advantage of state-guaranteed public financing” (ACT 2008: 36). Thus this remark is used to justify the AFCs extensive revision-proposal of the Communication.  
Summary The core beliefs expressed in the way the association perceives problems and the causes are predominantly of a liberalist character and the policy core beliefs tend to revolve around solutions and arguments that are linked to the EU-level. The core problem is that the PSBs are 
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too powerful and do not stick to their remit. By adding developments in the media world in general and the outdated Broadcast Communication of 2001 due to development in related case law, ACT argues that a change in the Communication is timely, so	  this	  ‘automatic’	  distortion can be corrected in the new media reality and not transported to new emerging markets (ACT 2008: 7). Given the nature of ACT, these findings are not surprising and they confirm our initial assumptions of the positions of the liberal stakeholders.  It is, however, interesting that the amount of goodwill and willingness to understand the European media market from a dirigiste point of view is this limited. When ideas and beliefs from the PSB’s	  are referred to, it is used to display the PSB’s unfairly gained market power position and their illusive intentions.  In their own conclusion, they	  do	  recognize	  the	  ‘dual	  media	  system’,	  but	  they	  argue that there are market failures in the system, stemming from the past. In the new digital age, EU must do what is necessary not to repeat this distortion by making the BC even more clear and detailed.  This analysis of the ACT position paper finds that the ACT is not very consensus seeking, and that they depict the commercial broadcasters as the underdog. Therefore, the update of the BC is a very welcomed initiative. Thus the push for change is strong.     
European Newspaper Publisher Association The European Newspaper Publisher Association (ENPA) is the umbrella interest organization of national European associations of newspaper publishers. The ENPA has 29 members (Niiranen 2008:4).  
The	  ENPA’s	  position in the process of the update of the 2009 Broadcast Communication is interesting to examine because their concern for the competition in the online media market is presented by the Commission as a reason for the EC to update the communication (EC 2009: §16). Furthermore, some of the print media associations have taken part in the development of the EC decision practice as complainants (Donders & Moe 2014: 431pp). 
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Problems and causes  Similar to the arguments of the ACT, the European Newspaper Publisher Association (ENPA) believes that distortion of competition on the new markets is the core problem when it comes to coexistence between European public service broadcasters and commercial media. This 
distortion	  is	  due	  to	  the	  PSBs’	  move	  to	  the	  internet,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  ENPA,	  is	  a	  violation	  of the PSBs remit. The reason for this is that the	  PSB’s	  production	  of services online are too similar to the commercial	  competitors’	  services,	  and	  no	  longer	  serves	  the	  public	  interest	  (Niiranen 2008: 2). Furthermore, the ENPA argue that dual funding through advertising revenues distorts the market even further, because publishers have to rely on advertising and 
subscription,	  whereas	  the	  PSB’s	  have	  unlimited	  access	  to	  reliable	  funding	  from	  the	  state (Niiranen 2008: 2). In this way, the	  PSB’s	  presence	  online	  is	  harmful,	  because	  “competition 
between newspapers at national, regional and local level is not guaranteed	  if	  the	  PSB’s	  compete	  
directly	  with	  online	  newspapers” (Niiranen 2008: 7).  
Even	  though	  the	  ENPA	  do	  believe	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  PSB’s	  online	  is	  unfair	  competition,	  the online market is “substantially	  different	  from	  the	  traditional	  broadcasting	  market” (Niiranen 2008:3). There is, according to the ENPA, no conflict at the offline market, when they perform traditional broadcasting activities whilst fulfilling their public service remit. This is	  different	  from	  the	  ACT’s	  problem	  perception;	  it	  limits the critique to the new services and the ENPA does not ‘devil	  shift’	  by attributing	  evil	  motives	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  PSB’s.  This shows how different stakeholders within the same advocacy coalition can argue the same case, whilst being either confrontational or cooperative, and have different perceptions of problems and causes. The members of ENPA is not	  in	  direct	  competition	  with	  the	  PSB’s	  until	  the introduction of the online services.  
Solutions  The position paper of the ENPA is careful to highlight the central role of member states. This leaves the opinions on which solutions there is to the distortion of competition less clear-cut. Consequentially, the ENPA as a stakeholder does not fit neatly to our assumptions on the liberal advocacy coalition, as they would expectedly look to solutions on the supranational level. This prioritizing of the Member States is established in the beginning of the 
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introduction: “Member States should maintain the competence to decide on their own media 
policy or policies. ENPA sees no reason to justify the introduction of EU-wide	  media	  policy	  rules” (Niiranen 2008:2).  One argument for favoring solutions on the national level, can be that their markets are also primarily national. This can be seen in the very first statement of the position paper: “Cross-
border sales of printed newspapers are marginal: generally less than one percent. Online 
newspapers	  are	  mostly	  read	  in	  Europeans’	  own	  languages	  and	  close	  or	  at	  their	  place	  of	  living.” (Niiranen 2008:2). This shows that, although their position on solutions different than the 
ACT’s,	  they	  still	  use	  a	  utility-maximizing reasoning which is considered legitimate in the liberal coalition. Their overall perception of media policy solutions as a national concern is also reflected in how the	  association,	  to	  several	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  questions,	  points	  to	  their	  
national	  member	  associations’	  own	  reply	  to	  the	  questionnaire,	  due	  to	  the	  ‘country	  specific’	  character of the question (Niiranen 2008:6).   Out of the 29 member associations, six national associations have submitted their own reply to the questionnaire. The national associations, which did reply was associations from Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Finland (EC Competition 2012). Response from around a fifth of ENPAs members is not many, taking into consideration that the ENPA 
actively	  refers	  to	  these	  replies	  in	  order	  to	  give	  a	  complete	  answer	  to	  the	  EC’s	  questions.	  A	  relative short reply from the ENPA, combined with the confidence that their national members argue their own case – which they predominantly do not - can show a more loosely organized advocacy coalition amongst newspaper publishers. They may share the same system of beliefs, but have to a lesser degree coordinated their activities, which, according to the ACF, can be characterized as week coordination, where actors merely monitor each 
others’	  activities	  and	  make	  smaller	  adjustments	  in	  their	  own	  claims	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  suitable to one another (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 140). The ACF can also explain this as 
a	  ‘free-riding’	  behavior,	  which	  is	  more	  likely	  in	  a	  ‘material’	  coalition, as opposed to a purposive group (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 138). In such a group, the actors seek to maximize their own material interest and are to a lesser extend concerned with ideological reasoning.    
Shared Beliefs or Sheer Competition?   Spring 2015: EU-studies K1 
A Study of European Public Service Broadcasting  Roskilde University 
Page 44 of 74   
Worth noticing is that the ENPA does not call for an update of the BC due to legal developments in case law and the recent Commission Decisions on state aid to PSBs; they are not mentioned at all. Downplaying the legal aspect at the European level could arguably be linked to the ENPA’s belief in solutions at the national level.   Still, they do support ‘updating	  or	  completely	  reviewing’	  the BC. According to the ENPA, the BC is a “necessary	  tool	  which	  should	  give	  specific guidance to the EU Member States to lay rules 
for	  their	  PSBs”	  (Niiranen 2008: 2pp). It is thus made clear that the EU plays an important 
guiding role to the member states and the BC is thus, in accordance with the statement regarding member states’	  competences in the media policy field, subordinate to decisions at the national level.  
Summing up In sum, the position of the ENPA in favor of an update of the BC that can support the member states in their actions against the distortion of competition in the new online market. The focus on the national competences may be a reason why the ENPA refrains from calling for an update based on European legal developments.   National solutions and a limited range of problems and causes definition give the impression of a liberal stakeholder, with a tendency to favor dirigiste solutions, which is contradictory to our assumptions of stakeholders in the liberal advocacy coalition. This nuances the picture of the liberal advocacy coalition.  This does not necessarily mean that the ENPA shares policy core beliefs with the public service believers, however. Rather it could be a sign of the utility-maximizing rationality of a liberal policy core belief: to seek influence in the market one operates. Furthermore, the ENPA as an umbrella organization shows signs of a weak coordinating ability and thus solutions and proposal for change are less clear-cut.  
The	  Commercial	  Media’s	  Common	  Position This joint letter is a short, but intense, plea to the Commissioner of Competition, Neelie Kroes. It is dated on February 10th 2009, whereby it is a part of the second public consultation round. It urges her to “resist	  pressure	  from	  national	  cultural	  ministers	  who	  are	  currently	  attempting	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derail the sensible proposal on state aid to public broadcasters” (Travernost et al. 2009: 1). The authors of the letter are the chairpersons of four European commercial media associations and a German, amongst them the ACT and ENPA.  Prior to this letter we have seen no visible signs in the policy process of a coordination of actions between these actors, which gives this joint letter a character of a short-term coordination. Short-term coordination is seen when actors, who share policy core beliefs develop a common strategy to stand stronger in a specific policy controversy (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 139).   
Problem Perception The initial plea, as referred to above, can be seen as an example of devil shifting, evident in the 
rhetorical	  elements	  in	  the	  phrase	  ‘attempting	  to	  derail’.	  This is a problem, because according to the authors of	  this	  letter,	  Member	  States’	  ministers	  on	  culture	  have	  their	  own	  ‘vested interests’ in trying to change the draft communication (Travernost et al. 2009: 1). The ministers are responsible for allocating large sums of money to the PSBs, they remind the Commissioner. Therefore they should not be allowed to dictate how the EU should conduct the principles of competition policy, because “it	  appears…	  to	  rob	  the	  European	  Commission,	  the	  
guardian of the Treaties, of its vital role as	  an	  independent	  competition	  authority”	  (Travernost et al. 2009: 1). Thus, the very authority of the Commission is at stake here, due to these current attempts from the member states. Furthermore, the writers take the opportunity to repeat that the PSBs compete unfairly as they “…	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  public	  purse	  to	  launch	  
onto	  new	  media	  platforms,	  sometimes	  with	  questionable	  public	  interest…”	  (Travernost et al. 2009: 1).  
These	  statements	  exemplify	  how	  the	  ‘devil	  shift’	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  from	  the	  ACT	  position paper also is present in this letter: the ministers have hidden agendas and the so-called public interest of the PSBs is sometimes questionable. Thus, this way of characterizing the ministers is a way to undermine their argumentation and question their right to seek to influence the process.  The joint letter from the commercial media coalitions gives salience to the role of the European competition policy. They urge the Commission to resists the pressure from the 
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ministers, because “it	  is	  our	  firm	  belief that the European competition policy has a vital role to 
play in shaping the globally competitive, diverse European industry which we all hope will 
emerge	  from	  the	  current	  downturn” (Travernost et al. 2009:1). In this quote it is expressed how the authors of the letter firmly believe in a European solution to current economic downturn. And more than that, the “…	  interest	  of	  Europe’s	  consumers	  are	  best	  protected	  by	  
thriving, competitive markets in which state aid, while permissible, is not allowed to distort the 
market” (Travernost et al. 2009: 2). While this quote expresses a tolerance of state aid, a policy core belief in the wonders of EU competition policy is present. The EU competition policy shall bring Europe out of recession and it protects the interests of European consumers in the best possible way.  Learning or weak coordination between ACT and ENPA There is little sign of emphasis on the competences of the member states in this letter to the Commissioner of Competition. The coalition states that the text of the draft communication 
‘contains	  very	  important	  guidance	  to	  Member	  States…	  [which	  is]	  crucial	  in	  finding	  a	  sensible	  
equilibrium…	  (Travernost et al. 2009: 1). Also, the coalition believes that the 2001 BC update 
“could	  best	  be	  done	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  Member	  States”. Here we see signs of the position held by the ENPA who were very careful to underline the competences of the member states in their position papers. However, the guiding role of the Commission is	  in	  this	  letter	  is	  ‘very	  important’	  and	  the	  update	  of	  the	  communication	  should	  be	  done	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  member states, which indicates that the ENPA has modified their belief and moved towards a supranational solution.  It is thus the positions, which was most explicitly held by the ACT in their position paper, which we also see in this letter. Namely the tendency to perceive the actors of the other coalition as	  ‘evil’	  and	  ‘powerful’	  and	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  important	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  the	  suitable forum to bring about a sustainable solution on the competition distortion.  
The	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  ENPA’s	  main	  positions	  is	  not	  present	  in	  this	  letter	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  different ways. It can be an indication of policy learning within a coalition, where the actors have reached a degree of consensus based on an increased knowledge of the issue followed by a change in the perception on what the probable impact of a different solution to the issue 
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would be (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123). In this case, it would mean that the ENPA had gained more knowledge about the role of the Commission regarding competition law and the potential for the Commission to affect the field of PSB regulation. Based on that knowledge the ENPA would then come to the conclusion that it was better to advocate a solution on the EU-level.    
It	  could	  also	  indicate	  a	  ‘weak’	  coordination	  between	  the	  stakeholders	  in	  this	  short-term coordination. According to the ACF, a weak coordination in a coalition is often seen in high-conflict cases where actors, that generally share the same set of policy beliefs, give way to an issue that is more important to another member of the coalition, or in cases where one member of the coalition have more information- or legal power. In these cases the one part of the coalition only has to monitor the behavior of the other and alter its own positions in order to be in line. It is also characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘devil	  shifting’,	  where	  the	  opponent	  is	  portrayed as evil in order to rally more members to the coalition (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 140).  This could very well be the case in the relationship between the ACT and ENPA. In the previous sections of the analysis, we have revealed that the position paper of the ACT was much more comprehensive and detailed than the position of the ENPA. Furthermore, the ACT depicts the PSBs as evil, self-interest-maximizing market players with too much market power. Finally, the ACT has been competing with PSBs for more years than the print media publishers, who only are beginning to share the new market online with the PSBs. This could indicate both that the PSB issue is more salient to the ACT and that the ACT has more information power in this area and therefore the ENPA has altered their political strategy to strengthen the common position of the commercial media coalition.    Based on the analyzed documents in this study it is uncertain for what reasons the change in the perceived solution has come about. A change in the perceived role of the Commission is a change in a policy core belief, which according to the theoretical framework, is rather resistant to change (see Belief Systems, p. 13). Therefore, the latter scenario of a weak, short-term coordination between the actors could be a more suitable explanation on the alignment of argumentation.      
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The Liberal Coalition: Interim Conclusion  
The various interest organizations representing the broadcasting and publishing media industry analyzed in this section all agree on the same problem and causes in the field of PSB and state aid: the PSBs are distorting healthy competition on old and new markets due to government funding. However, there is a tendency to ‘devil	  shift’	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  ACT	  position paper, which is absent in the ENPA.  The difference in their argumentation is linked to the solution-axis between the national and the supranational. The ACT is a firm believer that the Commission through more regulation is the right institution to correct the market distortion. They argue for how the EU through existing law do have sufficient competences to do so. Thus, the policy core beliefs of the ACT are in accordance with the theoretical assumption; liberal believers look to the supranational level for competition problems.  Quite differently, the ENPA tends to emphasize the competences in each member state. It is relatively modest in the rhetoric in its position paper: all initiatives that can help to level the playing field are ‘welcome’, but the ENPA stresses that the initiative is in the hands of the member states. This finding shows that diverging preferences in solutions are present even within the same system of beliefs, which places the newspaper publishers association in line with the ACT in terms of perceived problems, but in line with the dirigiste position – especially with the member states - in terms of solutions.  Analyzing the joint letter from the commercial media world indicates that movement within 
the	  stakeholders’	  argumentation	  can	  be	  observed.	  Both	  ACT	  and	  ENPA	  are	  writers	  of	  the	  letter, but it is characterized predominantly by	  the	  ‘devil	  shift’	  rhetoric	  and a strong appeal to a solution on the EU level. This could indicate that the newspaper publishers associations have moved position towards the ideal-type liberal policy core belief.  
  
Shared Beliefs or Sheer Competition?   Spring 2015: EU-studies K1 
A Study of European Public Service Broadcasting  Roskilde University 
Page 49 of 74   
Second Part: The Path Towards a Communication 
In this part of the analysis, the changes from the 2001 to the 2009 BC are established, with the 
aim	  of	  identifying	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  two	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  belief	  systems	  in	  the	  2009	  BC.	  By analyzing how the path of the policy-process towards the 2009 BC can be characterized, we can assess to what extend this process can explain the change in the communication. Thus, this conclusive part of the ACF-based analysis concentrates on the institutionalization of discourses (see Causality in Discursive Institutionalism, p. 8).  The 2009 BC has undergone a number of changes since the 2001 version. First of all, the mere length of the document indicates this change: the 2009 version is twice as long as the 2001 version. Furthermore, a large amount of specific and technical paragraphs is added. In the following, we shall limit the discussion to include changes that are related to the liberal and dirigiste systems of beliefs and which path of change it indicates.      
The Change in Problem Perception Both Communications initially reflect the two opposing beliefs’	  problem	  definition.	  First, the belief in the preservation of PSB in the market is presented as a view of the member states, who advocates for the PSB “(…)	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	  the	  coverage	  of	  a	  number of areas and the 
satisfaction of needs and public policy objectives that would otherwise not necessarily be fulfilled 
to	  the	  optimal	  extent”	  (EC 2009:	  §2).	  Afterwards,	  liberal	  beliefs	  are	  expressed	  in	  the	  BC’s	  recognition that “(…)	  increased	  competition, together with the presence of State-funded 
operators, has also lead to growing concerns for a level playing field, which have been brought to 
the	  Commission’s	  attention	  by	  private	  operators” (EC 2009: §3). Thus, the BC describes a conflict between member states and the private operators – albeit much of the 2009 BC takes 
its	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  the	  private	  operators’	  problems.	   The context surrounding this risk of an uneven playing field, and thereby the cause of the problem, is in a way both different and similar to the two communications. It is different in the way that in 2001, the reason for the threat was the introduction of competition into the media market in general (EC 2001: §1), and in 2009, the reason was linked to the development (EC 2009: §1). Simultaneously, the context is also similar, in the way that these 
“private operators”	  are	  mentioned as the informers in both Communications, whereby their 
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role in the creation of the communication is shown: they have clearly had a finger in the pie in both cases. One of the changes in	  the	  2009	  BC	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  ‘new’	  stakeholder:	  The	  publishers (EC 2009: §5). In addition to the potential negative effects of the PSB’s in the traditional market, the fact that the PSBs are present on the internet and competes with publishers as well, can lead to a further distortion of competition when the different media actors seek to develop new business models within this new market of the internet (EC 2009: §16).  Publishers	  are	  now	  ‘formally’	  included	  as	  market players and thus possesses a voice, which the Commission listens to. Since the publishers share the liberal policy core belief with the commercial broadcasters, this inclusion reinforces the liberal advocacy coalition.  In general, the risk of market distortion remains the core problem perception in the 2009 BC, caused by the introduction of new communication platforms. This problem perception reflects the liberal belief of the commercial media, and can be seen as an indication that the member states and the EBU is in a disadvantaged position. The dirigistes are in a defensive position, because they do not share the understanding of market distortion as the core problem. A form of bounded rationality can be seen here, because the changes in technology and development in the market – and thus changes in both external and internal events – is translated through the liberal belief system as events that entails a risk of more unfair competition. Thus, we observe that the technological development is not perceived as a shock to the liberal belief system, as it is rather suitable for their arguments for a change. 
Interestingly,	  the	  dirigiste’s	  argues	  for the absolute necessity of their presence online, as a result of this very same development. As Kluth & Lynggaard (2013) argues, stakeholders can also deliberately use new circumstances, whose impact is not fully discovered, as pretexts to accomplish their goals. This could explain how both coalitions are able to use the technological development as arguments in their own belief systems. However, only the liberal reasoning is adopted in the 2009 BC.  The change towards a more explicit liberal problem perception in the 2009 BC can thus be explained by the path that the theory of ACF calls internal subsystem failures (see The Four 
Paths to Policy Change, p. 14). The uniform liberal perception of problems, expressed in the 2009 BC, points to unfair competition as a market failure within the media market, which initiates a change, because there is a common understanding of correcting this failure. The 
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reference to the dirigiste preservation of status quo is only presented once and as a member state concern, not a concern of the PSB’s.  
EC Decision Practice and Case Law One of the main changes from the 2001 BC to the 2009 BC is that it is	  “taking into account 
recent	  market	  and	  legal	  developments.” (EC 2009: §8). This includes considerable amount of decisions the Commission has issued in the previous years as well as the extensive development that case law in this area has undergone. Among the different cases that went to General Court, the 2003 Altmark Case is introduced as a legal reference in the new 2009 BC (EC 2009: §23). This is in line with the liberal coalition who has argued that the BC should include the Altmark Judgment.  The 2009 BC also states that the Commission has developed a significant decision-making practice and that “since	  2001,	  more	  than	  20	  decisions	  have	  been	  adopted	  concerning	  the	  
financing	  of	  public	  service	  broadcasters”	  (EC 2009: §4). These decisions have been made based on the complaints of distortion of competition from the commercial broadcasters and print media, and they enable the Commission to consolidate this practice in the 2009 BC (EC 2009: §8). What this process could indicate is that the liberal advocacy coalition successfully has managed	  to	  use	  the	  ‘Decision-venue’	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  affect	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  2009	  BC. By first filing a large number of complaints over a long period of time, and then successively arguing that the number of cases alone must mean that there is a problem to be addressed (see Development in Case Law, p. 39), the commercial operators have successfully put the question on the agenda. Interestingly, the fact that a vast majority of these decisions were in 
the	  PSB’s favor, is not included. In fact, only in two cases the Commission held that the 
activities	  of	  the	  PSB’s	  were	  incompatible	  with	  the	  competition	  law	  and	  thus	  illegal	  state	  aid	  (Donders & Moe 2014: 431). Neither is it mentioned, that the General Court ruled against the 
Commission’s	  Decision in one of the two cases on illegal state aid to PSB (EC 2008b). Furthermore, the General Court Judgment, which the EBU refers to in order to draw attention 
to	  the	  member	  states’	  exclusive	  competences	  in	  the	  field	  of	  SGEI’s, is not included in the 2009 BC.  This sign of a further liberal turn in terms of change based on Court Cases and Commission Decisions does reflect a high-conflict path of events leading to the 2009 BC. There is no 
Shared Beliefs or Sheer Competition?   Spring 2015: EU-studies K1 
A Study of European Public Service Broadcasting  Roskilde University 
Page 52 of 74   
common case of reference between the two coalitions and the dirigiste coalition has not 
managed	  to	  use	  the	  Commission’s	  decision-making as an argument to keep the status quo. 
There	  is,	  however,	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  ‘negotiation	  path’	  towards	  this	  change,	  understood	  as	  a	  situation	  where the Commission appears as a broker, balancing the beliefs of the two coalitions and incorporating elements of both in the 2009 BC. The excerpt from the Amsterdam Protocol is repeated in its full length – not only one part or another. Furthermore, even if the change predominantly happen on basis of liberal influence, the dirigistes have managed to maintain their recommendation that future Decisions shall be kept on a case-by-case approach (EC 2009: §41).   
The Change Regarding	  PSB’s	  Role Although the first part of the 2009 BC mainly reflects the liberal belief, there are examples of changes, which reflects the dirigiste approach as well. All paragraphs, except for the very last, in Chapter two comprises a list of viewpoints expressed by other institutions, which establishes the PSB as an essential part of cultural, social and democratic life in the EU (EC 2009: §12). Among others, it refers to article 11 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and article 10 in European Convention of Human Rights to stress that safeguarding and securing the independence of broadcasting is of key importance (EC 2009: §10). Furthermore, the role of PSB’s to promote cultural diversity was recognized by a UNESCO Convention in 2005, which has been adopted into EU law by the Council (EC 2009: §13). Some parts, regarding the role of PSB, are directly transposed from the 2001 BC, one of which states that “Public	  service	  
broadcasting, although having a clear economic relevance, is not comparable to a public service 
in	  any	  other	  economic	  sector” (EC 2009: §9). This is clearly in line with the view of the EBU regarding the specificity of PSB (see The Specificity of PSB, p. 28).  Regardless the long list of reasons to treasure the PSB’s in Chapter two, the Commission dedicates the last Paragraph of the Chapter to spell out that the commercial broadcasters indeed contributes to the objectives of the Amsterdam Protocol of media pluralism and that 
they	  “enrich	  cultural	  and	  political	  debate”	  (European Commission 2009: §16). To include the commercial media, in particular the publishers, in a chapter dedicated to describe the value of public service media, can be regarded as a change in how the Commission perceives public service liabilities. Thus, it strengthens the position of the liberal coalition.  
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The second chapter of the 2009 BC thus shows how the Commission seeks to balance the argumentation from both coalitions, which indicates that the process of change have followed a negotiating path. Furthermore, the change encompasses a new understanding of the commercial media’s	  abilities	  to	  fulfill	  public	  service	  liabilities.	  	  	  	   
The Public Service Remit In the 2001 BC, the Commission recognizes that a definition of what constitutes a public service remit falls within the member states competences and therefore, ”given	  the specific 
nature	  of	  the	  broadcasting	  sector,	  a	  ‘wide’	  definition	  (…)	  may	  be	  considered	  (…)	  legitimate	  under	  
article	  86(2)”	  (EC 2001: §33). The Commission clearly leaves a substantial scope for the member states to maneuver within the provisions on competition	  law	  here,	  since	  a	  ‘wide’	  interpretation is considered acceptable.  Under the corresponding paragraph in the 2009 BC, however, this wording is removed. Instead it is expresses that the public service mandate should be defined ”as	  precise	  as	  
possible” and	  ”leave no doubt as to whether a certain activity performed by the entrusted 
operator	  is	  intended	  by	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  public	  service	  remit	  or	  not” (EC 2009: §45). Only two articles further down, however, the Commission recognizes that due to the specific nature of the broadcasting sector, ”a	  qualitative	  definition	  (…)	  is	  generally	  
considered	  (…)	  legitimate	  under	  article	  86(2)”	  (EC 2009: §47). Even if the remit is narrowed, it is still in the sole competences of the member states to define this remit (EC 2009: §12). This change meets the collective position from the liberal coalition to tighten the remit in order to prevent market distortion, but it still leaves some discretion to the member states in terms of the permission to keep the defining competences and a qualitative definition. This partly meets the concerns from the EBU, whilst on the other hand completely ignoring their plea to keep the wide definition. In	  return,	  the	  member	  states’	  insistence	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity is met. Thus, the path towards this change in the definition of the remit is a compromise between two opposite positions, with a minor bias towards the liberal approach, 
but	  with	  an	  unchanged	  respect	  of	  the	  member	  states’	  exclusive	  competences	  in	  terms	  of defining this remit.     
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Introducing the Ex-Ante Test The introduction of the ex-ante test in the 2009 BC is described under the headline 
“Diversification	  of	  public	  broadcasting	  services”	  (EC	  2009:	  §88). The paragraph states that member states shall ensure that significant new services add value to society by fulfilling 
“democratic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  needs	  of	  society”, without distorting competition (EC 2009: §88). Although the responsibility of assessing the costs and benefits lies with the member states, or more accurately with an independent body on national level, the Commission decides the regulatory framework providing the scope of action for this national body. Van den Bulck & Donders (2014: 19) have interpreted this change as a result of policy-oriented learning. According to the theory, learning happens when coalitions and stakeholders gain new knowledge and on that basis change their beliefs and actions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123).	  Based	  on	  our	  findings	  on	  the	  respective	  coalitions’	  limited ability 
or	  willingness	  to	  coordinate	  actions	  and	  the	  aspect	  of	  ‘devil-shifting’,	  we	  identify	  weak	  coordination within the two coalitions, which is supported by the theoretical notion that weak coordination often is a characteristic in high-conflict situations (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 140). Learning in such environments is thus not very likely to occur (Weible et al. 2009: 130), and is not apparent in this case either, which makes us look to other possible paths leading to the introduction of ex-ante tests rather than policy-oriented learning.  Instead of learning, the ex-ante tests could be a result of another negotiation process, where the liberal position is almost fully met in the BC; almost, because the dirigiste position managed to alter the final text from all new services to significant new services (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 19). The ex-ante tests, which were a major touchstone for the liberal coalition, may have been possible to introduce, because EBU stopped arguing against the ex-ante tests in their second position paper in order to be in line with the member state position. This suggests that EBU did not have the support from the member states and decided to coordinate their position with the member states instead of holding their ground.  
Second Part: Interim Conclusion In contemplating the different paths of change, this conclusive part of the ACF analysis suggests that the change predominantly can be characterized as a negotiation process. The two policy core beliefs remain stable and opposite throughout the decision-making process 
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and compromises are reached with help from the Commission in the role of a policy broker. This is observed regarding core issues such as the definition of the remit and the introduction of ex-ante test. The 2009 BC is also careful to emphasize the legal developments that support the unique position of the PSB’s as well as highlighting the coexistence between private and public media as a distinct European feature.    Despite significant signs of compromises, the change in the 2009 BC is predominantly influenced by the liberal policy belief system. This can arguable be the case due to an observed dominance of the liberal problem perception that there is a failure internally in the subsystem itself. Furthermore,	  the	  liberal	  success	  in	  the	  ‘legal	  venue’	  is	  also	  consequential	  to	  the liberal turn.      This analysis does not find clear signs that policy-oriented learning drives this change process, however. The coordination ability of the two coalitions is too weak and the environment is too high-conflict for such a learning process to be realized.  The compromises of this negotiating path, however, is not reached by the advocacy coalitions 
themselves,	  but	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  balancing	  act	  between	  the	  policy core beliefs.  Dirigiste arguments are expressed to a lesser extent; in turn, the	  member	  states’	  exclusive	  competences in terms of the right to define the remit is reiterated. This means that we can draw parallels between this change and the movement within the dirigiste advocacy coalition towards an argumentation tied to the principle of subsidiarity.  These changes can to a wide extent be explained by the ACF, but leaves the question open whether the change can be explained by beliefs alone, or if the role of the Commission as an institution is instrumental in the change as well. This role for institutionalized discourses as constitutive to beliefs shall be examined in the next section with Discursive Institutionalism as theoretical framework.    
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Third Part: Institutions and Ideas 
The following part of the analysis examines and discusses the discursive processes at stake. Our own findings will be discussed using the theoretical framework Discursive Institutionalism, in relation to the dynamics of discursive processes. These processes are regarded as the interplay between the discourses that are expressed in the formal and informal institutions. These institutionalized discourses are mutually constitutive for the sentient actors, which means that they can affect, and be affected by, the actors. The point of departure is the critiques brought by Van den Bulck & Donders (2014: 29) that the role of the European Commission is difficult to describe using the ACF, as it can be viewed as both venue for stakeholders to seek influence, a broker that balances the interests of coalitions, and as a stakeholder and actor in its own right. The aim of the following analysis is to apply the aspects of DI that may lend insight to these shortcomings. 
Institutional Setting 
The	  Commission’s	  role	  and	  the	  predominant	  discourse	  can	  be	  further	  elaborated	  on	  through	  an analysis of the institutional setting, as discourses must be understood “in	  terms	  of	  the	  rules	  
that frame ideas and discourse in different political-institutional settings” (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004: 197), which implicates that the articulations of ideas, which has been examined using the ACF, is affected by the institutional setting in which it takes place. Looking at the formal institutions first allows us to take into	  account	  for	  example	  the	  Commission’s	  role	  and	  the	  formalized procedures that they are subject to, and the division of competences, when discussing the change.  The Commission has, in the previous analyses, been seen as a broker. From that point of view, the Commission merely tries to merge the conflicting interests, having no belief system and, in DI terms, no background ideational abilities or foreground discursive abilities (Schmidt 2010: 4). Taking into account	  the	  Commission’s	  role	  as	  guardian of the Treaties, which is arguably a highly institutionalized practice, can serve as an explanation for their perceived importance of the new BC. Their argument that the 2009 BC is necessary as a means of clarifying the rules – and thereby indirectly to ensure a uniform interpretation of the rules – can then be seen as a 
direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  role	  in	  the	  institutional	  setting,	  and	  their	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responsibility to ensure the correct interpretation of EU law. As is argued by Radaelli & Schmidt (2004), the coordinative practices becomes more predominant in compound policy systems, which arguably can be even more the case in a Communication, because it requires a widespread support in order to work because it is not legally binding and leaves a relatively wide scope of interpretation.  By the same logic, the existence of the particular conflict lines as has been accounted for can be linked to the formal institutions, in this case being the division of competences in EU law. It can also be linked the institutional setting, being the Commission’s	  procedures	  on	  creating	  a	  Communication.  The division of competences can be said to provide the frame for the discussion, as the 
question	  must	  be	  located	  within	  the	  Commission’s	  competences,	  of	  which	  it	  has	  the	  most	  on competition policies. Consequently, the debate is not dominated by highly technical issues and scientific research, and the stakeholders are not predominantly regulatory bodies – as opposed to for example environmental policies. However, economic concerns must necessarily be the rationale behind the arguments of all actors, which can be seen in the 
questions	  posed	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  Questionnaire	  (EC 2008a). This can arguably be a consequence of the institutional setting, being discussed at the EU level, where competition policy is the point of departure.  This also serves as an explanation to the development towards a quantification of the public service remit. An example of the indicators of the change is that the Commission must ensure that the state aid is not only allowed according to EU law, but also proportionate in value held against the financial aid. The quantified assessment of the democratic, social and cultural needs of society becomes a predominant discourse, an aspect that has also been examined by Lowe & Berg (2013: 92). As Lowe & Berg (2013) argues, PSB “(…)	  is framed by economic and 
financial considerations, with the first keyed to defining systemic conditions and the later to 
stipulating	  more	  precise	  operational	  parameters” (Lowe & Berg 2013: 78). In their paper, they argue that the debate on funding of PSB is not merely an expression of economic concerns, but is rooted in wider issues (Lowe & Berg 2013: 77). Two layers can arguably be found in the debate; one that is normative, on the raison	  d’être	  of	  PSB in general, and one on the economic considerations. The role of the Commission, which is to ensure the uniform application of EU 
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law, in combination with the overweight of competences in competition policies, creates a framework for the discursive interactions where the normative concerns on the cultural, democratic and social function of PSB cannot be the only frame of reference.  If the institutional setting, being the level of governance, is considered one of the determining factors for the change, the debate on the EU-level cannot by that logic, be expected to be directly transmissible to other levels of governance such as member states, due to their differences in formal and informal institutions compared to the EU. The debates and the discourses in different member states can, for example, be expected to depend on their history and traditions regarding PSB. PSB has taken on many different shapes – in some member states relying on dual funding through commercial activities, and in other, relying solely on license fees (Sarikakis 2004: 104)3.	  The	  member	  states’	  competences	  to	  decide	  on	  the role of their specific PSB leaves more room for discussing the content of PSB at the national level.  This is very much in contrast to the discussion on EU level, where there is a common 
understanding	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  member	  states’	  cultural,	  social	  and	  democratic	  needs – which is a premise for the dirigiste	  coalition’s argument that uniform criteria regarding the public service remit would not be	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  PSB’s	  responsibility	  to	  answer to the cultural, social and democratic needs of society. As is evident in the 2009 BC and in EU law in general, this premise is accepted and thereby considered legitimate. As Radaelli & Schmidt (2004) argue, the discourse is more likely to spread and be considered legitimate “if	  it	  resonates	  with	  long-standing or newly-emerging	  values” (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004: 201). Based on this theoretical notion, it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  while	  the	  Commission’s	  values may be tied up to the liberalization of the market, they still acknowledge the differences between member states. The	  notion	  that	  the	  European	  ‘Public	  Sphere’	  is	  not	  very	  cohesive has been argued by many scholars in both EU- and communication research, that points to the lack of a pan-European public sphere or a common identity (Machill et al. 2006: 61; Kaina & Karolewski: 8, respectively). The move away from this particular normative reasoning can be supported by the finding in the first part of the analysis that the EBU moved slightly towards the member states in the second public consultation.                                                           3 Examples of the latter are UK, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (Sarikakis 2004: 104) 
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Cognitive Aspects in the Discourse When examining the reason for the change in the discourse, the institutional setting is not necessarily the only factor that affects the cognitive and normative aspects of a discourse. In particular the cognitive aspect of the discourse, which is linked to “the	  policy	  programme’s	  
relevance, applicability and coherence”	  (Radaelli	  &	  Schmidt	  2004:	  202),	  is also a significant factor.  
When	  determining	  the	  Commission’s	  perception	  of	  the	  two beliefs’ relevance in the policy-building process,	  one	  could	  zoom	  out	  and	  assess	  the	  role	  of	  PSB’s	  in	  a	  broad	  perspective.	  According to McQuail & Cuilenberg (2003: 194p), who discuss the development in media policies and determine three overall media policy paradigms, the second paradigm is called 
the	  ‘public	  service	  paradigm’4 and it ended in the 1980-90s. In	  this	  paradigm,	  PSB’s	  role	  was based on concerns regarding democracy, bound by national interests and legitimized by social purposes. The conflict between public service broadcasters and the private enterprises already began in the last part of this period, but there were some resistance to the private 
operators’	  attempts	  to	  deregulate	  the	  market (McQuail & Cuilenberg 2003: 196). The third paradigm is characterized by political uncertainty because of the unknown consequences of the rapidly changing technology. These new technologies, and the merge between the different types of media- and communication platforms, challenges the notion of public service broadcasting as an important democratic institution in society, because the plethora of media- and communication platforms creates a more fragmented media system and more selective users. The introduction of smartphones and tablets is a prime example, and the corresponding entry of social media	  in	  citizens’	  daily	  lives have	  altered	  many	  people’s	  way	  of	  attaining information and entertainment. As citizens can decide when and where they want to consume, and as user-based information services flourish, the number of options for the consumers increases. These technological devices, and the corresponding changes in consumer patterns, have had substantial implications for media market structures as well, as the development has meant great changes to the possibilities of mass communication and broadcasting. According to McQuail & Cuilenberg (2003), “The	  emerging	  policy	  paradigm	  for	  
media and communications is mainly driven by an economic and technological logic, although it 
retains	  certain	  normative	  elements”	  (McQuail & Cuilenberg 2003: 198). A similar argument is                                                         4 The public service paradigm ranged from 1945-1980/90 (McQuail & Cuilenberg 2003: 194)  
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led by Trappel (2014), who argues that there are indications of a change in the values regarding the objectives of the media system, as a result of marketization or commercialization (Trappel 2014: 244). This overall development, which in particular can be seen in some of the measures taken within the other domains of European media policies such as the Television Without Frontiers Directive, indicates that commercialization processes have been welcomed by EU legislators.  This development, which affects the cognitive aspects of a discourse, has evidently played a 
part	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  line	  of	  thinking. Therefore, they should be addressed by the coalitions, in order to be perceived as relevant by the Commission. Both the liberal and dirigiste advocacy coalitions are affected by this cognitive aspect, which can be seen in that it is written into their argumentation. The dirigiste coalition sees the development as a reason 
to	  emphasize	  the	  specific	  role	  of	  the	  PSB’s	  to	  answer	  to	  the	  democratic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  needs of society, which cannot be undertaken by the private operators. Although the 
Commission	  recognizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  PSB’s	  and	  the	  need for them to benefit from the technological development, some differences can be found in the reasoning. This can be seen 
in	  the	  2009	  BC,	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  ‘The	  role	  of	  Public	  Service	  Broadcasting’,	  where	  the	  Commission argues that the commercial operators “(…)	  also	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  achieving	  
the objectives of the Amsterdam Protocol to the extent that they contribute to pluralism, enrich 
cultural	  and	  political	  debate	  and	  widen	  the	  choice	  of	  programmes” (EC 2009: §16). This particular excerpt from the 2009 BC can shed a light on the small, but perhaps significant, 
dissonance	  between	  the	  normative	  and	  cognitive	  aspects	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  and	  the	  EBU’s	  discourses. As it shows, the Commission highlights the objective of ensuring a pluralistic media system – an element that is not emphasized by the dirigiste coalition. In that way the Commission can be seen as perceiving the arguments of the EBU as less relevant in the context of the 2009 BC than the liberal line of thought. Perhaps this can be seen as an expression of their balancing act between the two coalitions – mainly concerned with the number of players on the field, as the quantitative aspect should ensure quality in their liberal logic, writing the market logics into the discourse – whilst still making room for the public service. However, it could also be seen as a consequence of the institutionalized discourses that the Commission is subject to itself, as its own role is very tied to the liberalization of the markets, as previously described.  
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Third Part: Interim Conclusion This interplay between normative and cognitive elements of the discourses, between institutionalized discourses and ideas, and between the Commission as an actor in its own right and an institutional setting, provides us with a more in-depth account for the processes in play. By applying some of the key notions of Discursive Institutionalism, a different 
understanding	  of	  the	  change	  in	  PSB’s	  role	  has	  come	  to	  the	  surface.	   The predominant institutionalized discourses that the Commission is bound by itself, affects the values and practices towards the liberal belief. However, certain institutionalized discourses such as the principle of subsidiarity, is also a determining factor in the reasoning.  It seems that the market logics are now part of the discourse in that the principle of pluralism no longer means that the public service broadcasters provide an important alternative to the market players and therefore should be shielded from market mechanisms, rather that the market players are now considered to ensure this principle. The lack of dirigiste beliefs, or rather the selection of dirigiste arguments, in the 2009 BC can thus be explained by the 
dissonance	  between	  the	  Commission’s	  preexisting	  institutionalized	  discourses,	  which	  are primarily normative, and the relation between normative and cognitive aspects in the dirigiste discourse.  
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Conclusion 
How can the interplay between ideas and institutions explain the change in the perception of 
PSB’s	  role	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  2009	  Broadcast Communication?  In the three parts of the analysis, the explanations to the change in the approach to public service broadcasting and state aid as it is expressed in the 2009 Broadcast Communication were examined. This study has led to several interesting conclusions.  We find that the change between the 2001 and 2009 Broadcast Communication can be 
explained	  by	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  advocacy	  coalitions’	  beliefs. The	  EBU’s	  movement	  towards	  the	  
member	  states’	  common	  position	  weakens	  the	  dirigiste	  element	  in the advocacy coalition and 
strengthens	  the	  member	  states’	  emphasis	  on	  their	  exclusive	  competences.	  Regarding	  the	  change towards the liberal movement between the two Broadcast Communications, a similar change occurs in the liberal advocacy coalition, as the	  ENPA’s	  movement	  towards	  the	  ACT	  strengthens the liberal position.  In general, these movements within the coalitions show weak coordinative abilities, which is often found in high-conflict situations. This high-conflict situation supports the finding that the advocacy coalitions are unwilling to find common ground between them, which has led to 
a	  ‘negotiation	  path’	  towards	  change	  that	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  balancing act, not by learning.  At the same time, the Commission itself is arguably affected by formal institutions, which is instrumental to its weighting. Its role as guardian of the Treaties makes it more inclined to want a clarification of the rules, which is against the wishes of the dirigiste advocacy coalition. Secondly, its competences in the competition area, combined with the concern for the flourishing, pluralized media market, creates an understanding of the role of public service broadcasting which	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  dirigiste	  advocacy	  coalition’s	  understanding.	  However, the discretion for member states to define the public service remit is still protected due to the influential principle of subsidiarity.  The analysis furthermore pointed to a dissonance between the discourses of the Commission and the EBU, which could explain the predominance of elements of the liberal advocacy 
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coalition’s	  discourse	  in	  the	  2009	  Broadcast	  Communication.	  This can be exemplified by the notion in §16 of the 2009 Broadcast Communication, which regards the commercial broadcasters and publishers as contributors to the fulfillment of the objectives of public service broadcasting. Thereby, market players are now considered qualified to ensure certain aspects of the public service broadcasting’s	  role,	  whereby	  the	  role	  of	  the	  public service broadcasters and	  thereby	  their	  raison	  d’être,	  is	  more	  limited	  in	  scope.	   Thus, this analysis shows that explanations to the changed perception of the public service broadcasting’s	  role	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  beliefs,	  advocacy	  coalitions,	  paths, and institutions. 
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Discussion of Theories and Perspectives 
In this section, the utilized theories are discussed in terms of their applicability and explanatory power. Furthermore, the section also discusses how other theoretical approaches could contribute with alternative perspectives to the field of research.  The Advocacy Coalition Framework has provided a useful framework in terms of categorizing stakeholders and ideas and has thus to a wide extent offered useful explanations to the observed change in the Commissions approach to PSB. However, the categorization of coalitions entails a danger of oversimplification, which may have limited the nuances to the findings. The problem with categorizing a large number of actors within the same advocacy coalition may blur the attention to small, but significant, differences in their beliefs. In our study, this can be exemplified by the	  member	  states’	  common	  position	  in	  the	  dirigiste	  advocacy coalition, who are more determined to keep their subsidiarity prerogative, and covers a wide range of attitudes towards PSB.  The fact that they focus on the subsidiarity could in principle in light of the theories of differentiated integration (Stubb 1996: 286), reflect the lack of similarities in their approach on PSB. For example Köllikker (2001) could be applied as a means of describing the PSB using his theoretical distinction between the different type of goods, and the corresponding centripetal or centrifugal processes of integration. This theory could provide an insight into 
the	  member	  states’	  willingness	  or	  unwillingness	  to	  cooperate	  in	  this	  policy	  area.	  Another	  
concept	  that	  could	  explain	  the	  member	  states’	  reluctance	  to	  EU	  regulation	  in	  this	  field	  could	  be the organizational coupling between member states and EU level and the pressure to decoupling at the national levels (Andersen & Sitter 2006). This could also provide a better account for the degree of integration at member state level.  Another aspect that could be viewed as a lack of explanatory power for the member	  states’	  position and role in the process is the focus on beliefs as the primary explanatory power to change, which leaves questions of power relations unexamined (Van den Bulck & Donders 2014: 32). Thereby, there is a possibility that the reasons for the	  stakeholders’	  positions	  are	  
expressions	  of	  their	  attempt	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  gain.	  For	  example,	  the	  ENPA’s	  initial	  
support	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  member	  states’	  competences	  can	  just	  as	  well	  be	  understood	  from	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a power-perspective, where ENPA seeks influence in the national market they operate. 
Furthermore,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  lawsuits	  against	  the	  PSB’s	  from	  the	  commercial	  media	  could	  be seen as a short-term attempt to gain market shares and maximize their profits. In fact, it cannot be ruled out that the beliefs and arguments of the stakeholders in this study can be explained by utility-maximizing interests.  A common feature of the ACF and the DI is that both approaches attempt to explain changes. It could be argued, however, that the primary change in this policy field lies in soft law measures, where the member states normally have a considerable scope of action, and judicial practices, which is a somewhat slow development. Therefore, it could be interesting to examine what dynamics of continuity are at play, that may keep the integration level static. For example, the relationship between the negative integration through rules on prohibition of state aid in general and the development of the internal market could be examined by 
Pierson’s	  theory	  on	  path dependency (Pierson 1996), or perhaps be viewed as decision traps, where both member states and the Commission are bound by their commitments (Schimmelfennig 2001) to the internal market.     Furthermore, the theoretical development of ACF has strengthened the explanatory power, but it may now have become so comprehensive that it is capable of explaining virtually all routes to policy change, with no assessment of which paths that serve more plausible explanations than others do. However, this has been taken into account and as a way of trying to assess the explanatory power of the different paths, we have looked to Weible et al. (2009), who has examined the results of the empirical research on this theory that has been conducted.  DI has provided a useful theoretical framework in order to comprehend aspects of the policy process that are not as incorporated in the ACF approach, such as the conducive role of the institutional setting. By examining the institutional perspective, we have managed to offer a more comprehensive analysis of the change in the 2009 BC and thus strengthened our analytical points.  
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However, the lack of conceptual clarity of e.g. the concept of ‘discourses’	  has complicated the applicability of the theory. In Radaelli & Schmidt (2004), the terminology is not yet fully developed, which makes it difficult to separate the dependent and the independent variable. 
Later	  on,	  in	  Schmidt	  (2010:	  3),	  the	  term	  ‘discourse’	  is	  not	  clarified	  much	  either,	  as	  discursive	  institutionalism is perceived as an umbrella concept for a vast range of works, whereby discourses can be thought of as e.g. frames, myths, narratives etc.  The lack of explanatory power has also been acknowledged by Radaelli & Schmidt (2004), who argue that there are methodological considerations that the theory does not take into account. Perhaps for the same reason, they explicitly argue that epistemological and ontological questions are not considered (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004: 193). This has meant that the analysis of the discursive institutional processes, though a useful contribution, cannot yet work as theoretical explanation on its own, which makes it more suitable as a supplement to a more developed theory, such as the ACF.    
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